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Soucek: Categorical Confusion in Asylum Law

CATEGORICAL CONFUSION IN ASYLUM LAW
Brian Soucek*
Abstract
As the Trump administration placed ever-new categorical limits on
asylum, its opponents countered that asylum decisions have to be made
on an individualized basis. The government, they claimed, cannot
categorically exclude groups, like former gang members or victims of
gender-based violence, from protection against persecution. Successful
as this insistence on case-by-case adjudication has recently been, it
stands in tension with past cases in which groups such as nuclear families
or gay men were categorically deemed eligible for asylum. The litigation
and rulemaking currently reshaping asylum law suggest that neither side
in this debate fully understands whether, when, and why case-by-case
rather than categorical decision-making is required. In fact, it turns out
that what at first seems like confusion over procedure actually stems
from unclarity about the substantive tests being adjudicated: the “social
distinction” and, even more, the “particularity” requirements that are
currently (mis)used as the primary reason for denying asylum claims,
especially those brought by the tens of thousands of refugees fleeing
gang- and gender-related violence. Properly understanding these tests
allows for a better understanding of whether they can be categorically
applied—either to bar asylum claims or, perhaps in the Biden
administration, to make them possible.
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INTRODUCTION
Asylum law during the Trump administration was largely a series of
attempts to identify new groups of asylum-seekers to categorically
exclude from protection.1 The Trump administration’s opponents then
responded, often successfully, that asylum claims have to be considered
individually, case-by-case.2 Their success with this argument was surely
helped by the fact that the Trump administration often argued the same
thing—especially when asylum advocates had gotten courts or agency
officials to say, categorically, that certain groups, such as women, nuclear
families, or domestic violence victims, were eligible for protection from

1. See, e.g., Security Bars and Processing, 85 Fed. Reg. 41,201, 41,208, 41,211 (proposed
July 9, 2020) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 208, 1208) (allowing the categorical exclusion of
refugees from countries where a contagious disease is deemed prevalent); Procedures for Asylum
and Withholding of Removal, 85 Fed. Reg. 36,264, 36,281, 36,283 (proposed June 15, 2020) (to
be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 208, 235, 1003, 1208, 1235) (excluding generally gang-, wealth-, and
gender-based asylum claims, claims by refugees who traveled through another country, and
others); Order Suspending Introduction of Certain Persons from Countries Where a
Communicable Disease Exists, 85 Fed. Reg. 17,060, 17,061 (Mar. 26, 2020) (categorically
forbidding the “introduction” of refugees and others crossing the Canadian and Mexican borders
during the COVID-19 pandemic); Asylum Eligibility and Procedural Modifications, 84 Fed. Reg.
33,829, 33,835 (July 16, 2019) (categorically excluding refugees who passed through another
country when they fled to the United States from their place of persecution); Aliens Subject to a
Bar on Entry Under Certain Presidential Proclamations, 83 Fed. Reg. 55,934, 55,934, 55,935,
55,952 (Nov. 9, 2018) (categorically barring refugees who cross the Mexican border at
somewhere other than a designated port of entry); Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209,
13,215, 13,216 (Mar. 9, 2017) (halting the U.S. refugee resettlement program for 120 days and
reducing the yearly refugee quota). For a comprehensive catalogue of immigration restrictions
during the Trump presidency, see generally SARAH PIERCE & JESSICA BOLTER, MIGRATION POL’Y
INST., DISMANTLING AND RECONSTRUCTING THE U.S. IMMIGRATION SYSTEM: A CATALOG OF
CHANGES UNDER THE TRUMP PRESIDENCY (2020), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/usimmigration-system-changes-trump-presidency [https://perma.cc/M5GF-XSPH]; IMMIGRATION
POLICY TRACKING PROJECT (2021), https://immpolicytracking.org/ [https://perma.cc/KB5U8DYM].
2. See discussion infra Part II.
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persecution.3 In 2020, the Trump administration simultaneously argued
in some federal courts that asylum claims have to be evaluated case-bycase4 even as it insisted, in other federal courts5 and through the
rulemaking process,6 that categorical exclusions of certain types of
asylum-seekers were within its power.
This debate over case-by-case versus categorical adjudication of
issues or claims within asylum law generally gets framed as a procedural
problem—perhaps even one that implicates the Due Process Clause.7 But
any procedural confusion here actually stems from a deeper, substantive
issue: a failure to understand the doctrinal tests that now determine, for
example, whether victims of gender-based violence, LGBTQ refugees,
those fleeing gangs, or family members of those fleeing gangs might
qualify for asylum. The underlying substantive law—which currently
looks at a persecuted group’s immutability, particularity, and social
salience in the country of persecution8—is so poorly and inconsistently
applied that litigants have lost sight even of how it should be applied:
whether categorically or case-by-case. Lacking any principled
justification, claims about the necessity of case-by-case adjudication
become nothing but a litigation gambit opportunistically employed by
anyone on the losing end of a prior categorical judgment.
Consider a quick sample of the Trump administration’s inconsistency.
A rule proposed in June 2020 that aimed to fundamentally alter both the
substance and process of asylum law in the United States noted that
federal courts have “called into question”—which is to say, struck
down—the U.S. Department of Justice’s “approach of announcing
general rules of particular social group definitions”: rules dictating, for
example, that people who resist gangs or women who experience intimate
partner violence will not qualify for asylum.9 But the Proposed Rule, like
the Final Rule that followed,10 then went on to announce just such a
3. See discussion infra Part II. As will become clear, to say that these groups are eligible
is not to say that all group members will receive asylum. It merely means that theirs is the kind of
group that U.S. law recognizes as a potential ground for claims of asylum. See discussion infra
Part I.
4. See, e.g., Transcript of Motions Hearing Before the Honorable Rudolph Contreras
United States District Judge at 35–38, S.A.P. v. Barr, No. 19-cv-03549 (D.D.C. Mar. 2, 2020).
5. See, e.g., Brief for the Appellants at 56–57, Grace v. Barr, 965 F.3d 883 (D.C. Cir.
2020) (No. 19-5013); Appellants’ Reply Brief at 28, Grace v. Barr, 965 F.3d 883 (No. 19-5013).
6. See Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal, 85 Fed. Reg. at 36,281–82.
7. See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 32, Grace v. Whitaker, 344
F. Supp. 3d 96 (D.D.C. 2018) (No. 18-cv-01853) (originally filed as Grace v. Sessions).
8. The official term is now “social distinction.” See, e.g., Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N.
Dec. 208, 210, 212 (B.I.A. 2014), vacated in part, Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2016).
9. Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal, 85 Fed. Reg. at 36,278 n.27,
36,281.
10. Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal, 85 Fed. Reg. 80,274, 80,386,
80,395 (Dec. 11, 2020) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 208, 235, 1003, 1208, 1235).
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general rule, in fact expanding it to include all claims based on gender, as
well as past, present, or perceived gang membership and resistance to
gangs.11 Meanwhile, in federal court in the District of Columbia, the
Trump administration argued in one case that the Attorney General and
the Board of Immigration Appeals12 “must determine particular social
groups through case-by-case adjudication,”13 while simultaneously
insisting in another case that “the Board can and has adopted . . . general
rules applicable to what is a cognizable social group.”14
This Article provides a way out of this confusion: an account of
whether, when, and why asylum claims, or issues within them, can be
answered categorically.15 The clarity this account provides would not
11. Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal, 85 Fed. Reg. at 36,292, 36,300.
12. This Article, much like the caselaw it discusses, will refer to the Board of Immigration
Appeals as either the “BIA” or “the Board” in all that follows.
13. Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 23, S.A.P. v. Barr, No.
19-cv-03549 (D.D.C. Dec. 27, 2019); see also id. at 26 (“[T]o the extent that circuit precedent
does make categorical statements about families generally, those decisions are not in keeping with
the Board’s interpretation of the criteria for cognizable social groups, which depends on case-bycase adjudication, applying the facts of the case at hand to the criteria for valid groups.”); id. at
16 (“As the Supreme Court has long recognized, administrative and federal courts regularly and
properly interpret the asylum statute in the course of case-by-case adjudication.”).
14. Appellants’ Reply Brief, supra note 5, at 28.
15. This Article focuses exclusively on claims about categorical versus case-by-case
adjudication in particular social group asylum claims. But important disputes over categorical
exclusions are raging elsewhere in asylum law as well. The Trump administration’s recently
proposed bar on refugees coming from areas where contagious diseases are prevalent, see Security
Bars and Processing, 85 Fed. Reg. 41,201, 41,211 (proposed July 9, 2020) (to be codified at 8
C.F.R. pts. 208, 1208), provides one example, since the decision to deport refugees for national
security reasons has always previously been made in an individualized fashion, see Jerrold Nadler
et al., Comment Letter on Joint Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Security Bars and Processing, at
4–6 (Aug. 10, 2020), https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/security_bars_and_processing_
regulation_comment_08.10.2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/UA3V-JEED].
Another example comes from the Trump Administration’s attempt to categorically bar
asylum to refugees who do not request relief from another country on their way to the United
States. See Asylum Eligibility and Procedural Modifications, 84 Fed. Reg. 33,829, 33,835 (July
16, 2019) (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(c)(4) (2020)); E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr, 385
F. Supp. 3d 922, 930 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (“Under our laws, the right to determine whether a
particular group of applicants is categorically barred from eligibility for asylum is conferred on
Congress.”), aff’d, 964 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2020).
Perhaps the most studied use of the “categorical” in asylum law is the so-called “categorical
approach” used (or not) to determine whether a refugee’s prior conviction triggers the particularly
serious crime bar to deportation. See Fatma Marouf, A Particularly Serious Exception to the
Categorical Approach, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1427, 1428–31 (2017). To be clear, that is not the way
that “cateogorical” is used anywhere in this Article.
Though none of these disputes over categorical decision-making are discussed here, the
lesson of this Article—that the prohibition against categorical adjudication is not procedural, but
substantive, based solely on the nature of the thing being adjudicated—may well have
implications in these other areas. Developing those implications is left to future work, but even
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only save the government from the contradictions of its recent litigation
and regulatory strategy, but it would also offer asylum advocates a firmer
basis for challenging the remnants of that strategy and making the kinds
of categorical changes that will be necessary if the Biden administration
wants to reverse course. Categorical decision-making is not always antirefugee, after all, and case-by-case decision-making, while sometimes
more sensitive to individual refugees’ circumstances, can also be a
burden on those without the resources to relitigate every issue afresh.
To begin, Part I offers a short history of the substantive law governing
asylum claims based on “membership in a particular social group”—
which, along with race, religion, nationality, and political opinion, is one
of the five bases for protection from persecution under U.S. and
international law.16 Tracing the development of doctrine in this area not
only establishes the stakes of the current confusion over case-by-case
adjudication but also shows how some of the confusion developed.
As the government has added new elements to its test for particular
social groups over time, it has done more than increase the burden on
asylum-seekers; the government’s additions have changed the nature of
the procedural burdens the government itself must meet. A test that once
could be answered on a group-wide basis now includes fact-bound
elements that the government has to consider anew in each case. It turns
out that case-by-case adjudication is neither a constitutional due process
requirement nor a statutory directive. The need for it simply stems from
the nature of the test being adjudicated.
Next, Part II examines the confusion over this point within recent
litigation and regulatory efforts. In claims about gender-based violence,
persecution directed at gang resisters and their families, LGBTQ
refugees, and others, the government (and to a lesser extent its opponents)
have played both sides of the field—sometimes insisting on case-by-case
adjudication, while at other times either imposing or fighting for
categorical rulings.
Strategically choosing among reasonable arguments is to be expected
from advocates responsible for advancing the interests of their asylumseeking clients. It is more troubling, however, when done by the
government, tasked as it is with consistent and uniform enforcement of
the law. And, at least from a theoretical standpoint, it is unnecessary.
Categorical versus case-by-case adjudication is not an either/or; one
option or the other need not be, as it were, categorically pursued. The
here it is worth flagging the need to qualify overly sweeping claims, like this one from
Representative Nadler: “The INA simply does not permit, or even contemplate, class-based bars
to asylum or related forms of relief.” Nadler et al., supra, at 4–5. For reasons described below,
this claim is not just wrong, but potentially harmful to asylum-seekers, for it suggests that the INA
might not permit “class-based” grants of eligibility for asylum and related forms of relief either.
16. See infra text accompanying note 19.
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substance of current asylum doctrine, when properly understood, reveals
what procedure is required to apply it.
Finally, Part III offers a theory of when, and on what questions,
categorical pronouncements are allowable, and when case-by-case
adjudication is necessary. It explains why some parts of the “particular
social group test,” such as social distinction, require individualized
consideration while other parts, such as immutability, (often)
particularity, and (sometimes) circularity, can be decided categorically.
Part III also asks whether the problems with categorical adjudication,
such as they are, operate symmetrically—for those seeking to expand
eligibility for asylum just like those seeking to restrict it.
Importantly, the account developed here is meant to be more
clarifying than revisionary. That is to say, its presentation of asylum law
is not a revisionary account of what it might look like if written from
scratch. This Article takes blackletter asylum law largely as it stands but
offers advice for clearing up the inconsistencies, slippages, and
misunderstandings that often mar its application.17 If substance is to drive
procedure, as is argued here, one cannot understand what kind of
adjudication is required unless the substantive tests being adjudicated are
well understood.
Clarifying the doctrine in this way makes it easier to see whether, for
example, women persecuted because of their gender should qualify as
candidates for asylum under current law. But just as importantly, it
clarifies whether such questions can be answered categorically—in either
direction—or whether answers must be reached anew in each individual
case, one asylum-seeker at a time.
I. THE CASE-BY-CASE DEVELOPMENT OF ASYLUM LAW
Asylum is a statutory protection offered to refugees who have reached
the United States.18 Refugees have been defined—in international law
since 1951, as part of U.S. treaty commitments since 1968, and in federal
law since the Refugee Act of 1980—as people who have a “well-founded

17. For example, the Author believes the particularity criterion for social groups discussed
below in Part I and in Sections II.B and III.B is unnecessary and should be jettisoned. But here,
this Article argues instead how “particularity” is best understood, and whether, on that proper
understanding, the particularity test has to be applied case-by-case rather than categorically. See
discussion infra Section III.B.
18. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)–(b). Refugees can also be resettled from overseas; each year, the
President, in consultation with Congress, sets a cap on the number of those who will be. See id.
§ 1157(a)(2). For a history of this system, see generally Brian Soucek, The Last Preference:
Refugees and the 1965 Immigration Act, in THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT OF 1965, at
171 (Gabriel J. Chin & Rose Cuison Villazor eds., 2015).
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fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion.”19
Given the vagueness of so many of these statutory terms, the standard
for asylum and related protections20 has needed fleshing out “through a
process of case-by-case adjudication.”21 By this, the U.S. Supreme Court
did not mean that each new asylum applicant has to, or even gets to, argue
afresh the meaning of a “well-founded fear of persecution” or any of the
other statutory requirements. The Court meant only that precedent would
accumulate case-by-case, gradually clarifying the statute and further
binding future litigants with each new decision. (It is worth remembering
in what follows that case-by-case adjudication can have this meaning.22)
Perhaps the most ambiguous part of the refugee definition is the fourth
of its five grounds: membership in a particular social group. In 1985, the
BIA took a first crack at clarifying what this means in Matter of Acosta,23
where the Board applied the ejusdem generis canon, construing general
words (here, “membership in a particular social group”) “in a manner
consistent with the specific words” in the same list (here, race, religion,
nationality, and political opinion).24 All were said to share one thing: an
immutable characteristic that someone either cannot change or should not
have to change, since it is fundamental to their identity or conscience.25
Describing the “common, immutable characteristic” that unites
cognizable social groups, the Board went on to say:
The shared characteristic might be an innate one such as sex,
color, or kinship ties, or in some circumstances it might be a
shared past experience such as former military leadership or
land ownership. The particular kind of group characteristic
that will qualify under this construction remains to be
determined on a case-by-case basis.26

19. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1, ¶ A(2), July 28, 1951, 189
U.N.T.S. 137; Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1, ¶ A(2), Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T.
6223; see 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).
20. Those who fail to qualify for a discretionary grant of asylum might still receive the
lesser benefits of withholding of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). Like asylum, this is
offered to those facing persecution on account of one of the five grounds. Id. And like asylum,
withholding of removal provides a guarantee of non-refoulement—the international law norm of
non-return to the country of persecution. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra
note 19, art. 33, 189 U.N.T.S. at 176.
21. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 448 (1987).
22. See infra note 58 (citing widespread confusion on this point).
23. 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled in part by Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. &
N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987).
24. Id. at 233.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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Here again, importantly, talk of “case-by-case” determinations clearly
refers to the BIA’s intention to proceed trait-by-trait, or group-by-group,
deciding in future cases whether some “particular kind of group
characteristic” forms the basis of a social group—a potential ground for
an asylum claim.27
This, in fact, is exactly what went on to happen. Future cases resulted
in precedential opinions by the BIA or the courts of appeals recognizing
groups such as homosexuals in Cuba,28 the Marehan subclan in
Somalia,29 parents of Burmese student dissidents,30 and “young women
of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe who have not had [female genital
mutilation], as practiced by that tribe, and who oppose the practice” as
potential refugees.31 Meanwhile, they rejected other groups, such as
campesino cheesemakers,32 attractive young Albanian women,33 and
“homeless Honduran street children,”34 as cognizable “particular social
groups” for asylum purposes, meaning that members of these groups
would fail to gain asylum no matter how severe their persecution.
To be clear, each of these groups were accepted or rejected
categorically, not just for purposes of the case at hand. Thus, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, considering a case about “gay
men with female sexual identities in Mexico,” began with the fact that
the Attorney General had previously designated the BIA’s decision about
sexual orientation to be “precedent in all proceedings involving the same

27. Id. Findings that a particular social group is cognizable, and that the asylum-seeker is a
member of that group, are not all that is needed for the asylum claim to succeed. Applicants must
also show that they have a well-founded fear of persecution, and that their membership in the
particular social group would be “one central reason” for that persecution (the so-called nexus
requirement). 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i).
28. Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819, 822 (B.I.A. 1990) (rejecting the
argument by INS that “homosexuals were not a particular social group contemplated under the
[Immigration and Nationality] Act”). In June 1994, Attorney General Reno designated TobosoAlfonso “as precedent in all proceedings involving the same issue or issues.” Id. at 819 n.1
(quoting Att’y Gen. Order No. 1895-94 (June 19, 1994)).
29. Matter of H-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 337, 342–43 (B.I.A. 1996) (“Family Membership in the
Marehan Subclan Constitutes a Social Group.”).
30. Lwin v. INS, 144 F.3d 505, 512 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that parents of Burmese student
dissidents share “a common, immutable characteristic” capable of classifying as a particular social
group).
31. Matter of Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365 (B.I.A. 1996).
32. Alvarez-Flores v. INS, 909 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1990) (“Since it considered that
cheesemaking is not an immutable characteristic which cannot be changed by the campesinos, or
which they should not be required to change, the BIA found that petitioner’s claim did not meet
the statutory requirement.”).
33. Rreshpja v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 551, 555–56 (6th Cir. 2005).
34. Escobar v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 363, 365, 367 (3d Cir. 2005).
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issue or issues.”35 The court noted that “sexual identities are so
fundamental” that no one should be required to change them.36 And it
then “conclude[d] as a matter of law” that the particular social group in
question was cognizable37—which is to say that it could ground an
asylum claim, assuming all the other requirements (e.g., persecution and
nexus) were also established. Five years later, the Ninth Circuit doubled
down on the categorical nature of its holding: “[T]o the extent that our
case-law has been unclear, we affirm that all alien homosexuals are
members of a ‘particular social group.’”38
These categorical decisions made sense, given the test under Acosta.
Having determined that, say, homosexuality is immutable39 but youth is
not,40 courts or the BIA could decide as a matter of law that certain groups
do or do not qualify under the particular social group prong. Like any
other legal holding, these conclusions could always be revisited later, but
absent an argument sufficient to overcome stare decisis, these
determinations were otherwise meant, as Attorney General Janet Reno
put it, to serve as “precedent in all proceedings involving the same issue
or issues.”41 Social group determinations were categorical.
The Acosta immutability criterion remains a necessary but not
sufficient test of particular social groups under current asylum law. The
BIA’s and appellate courts’ “process of case-by-case adjudication”42 did
not just gradually expand the groups that had been categorically accepted
or rejected as potential grounds for asylum claims. It also eventually
expanded the number of criteria those groups had to meet.
A problem with the Acosta formulation—not in itself, but as the sole
criterion for recognizing social groups—is the fact that an infinite number
of groups are based around immutable characteristics. “People who
watched the Tony Awards with Brian Soucek in 2017” is a group united
by an immutable trait—the kind of “shared past experience” Acosta
rightly identified as unchangeable.43 But fellow award-show watchers are
35. Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1094 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Att’y Gen.
Order No. 1895-94 (June 19, 1994)), overruled in part by Thomas v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1177
(9th Cir. 2005).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1094–95.
38. Karouni v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1163, 1172 (9th Cir. 2005).
39. Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1094 (noting that the INS did not contest immutability
in Toboso-Alfonso).
40. Escobar v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 363, 367 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Nor is youth alone a sufficient
permanent characteristic, disappearing as it does with age.”).
41. Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819, 819 n.1 (B.I.A. 1990) (quoting Att’y
Gen. Order No. 1895-94 (June 19, 1994)).
42. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 448 (1987).
43. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled in part by Matter
of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987).
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not a group that, frankly, anyone cares about. Put a different way,
American society does not see itself as carved up into different camps
based on who watched the Tonys with whom. Things might have been
otherwise in a world that cared more about showtunes. However, no realworld society sees this as a salient basis for group membership—certainly
nothing like membership in a subclan, being gay or bisexual, or having
resisted your tribe’s practice of female genital mutilation.
In a series of decisions between 2006 and 2008, the BIA fumbled its
way toward a criterion that would make this insight explicit. C-A-,44 a
2006 case about confidential informants, talked of immutable
characteristics that are “generally easily recognizable and understood by
others to constitute social groups.”45 The BIA referred to this as a group’s
“social visibility”46—a metaphor that unfortunately led many astray,
causing adjudicators to sometimes require that a group’s unifying
characteristic be identifiable on sight.47 (C-A- itself rejected the
confidential informant’s claim because “the very nature of the conduct at
issue is such that it is generally out of the public view.”48) The BIA’s
subsequent opinions added an additional requirement: “[T]hat the group
have particular and well-defined boundaries.”49 This particularity
requirement asks “whether the proposed group can accurately be
described in a manner sufficiently distinct” rather than be “too
amorphous . . . to create a benchmark for determining group
membership.”50
Continued confusion and judicial resistance caused the BIA to revisit
these new criteria in 2014. In Matter of W-G-R-51 and Matter of M-E-V-G-,52
the BIA clarified that social visibility was never meant to be taken
literally. Just as a person’s religious or political beliefs can be known
without being seen, so too can society “consider persons to comprise a
group without being able to identify the group’s members on sight.”53 To
forestall further confusion, the BIA introduced a new name for the
criterion—“social distinction”54—and reaffirmed it, along with
44. 23 I. & N. Dec. 951 (B.I.A. 2006).
45. Id. at 959.
46. Id.
47. Brian Soucek, Comment, Social Group Asylum Claims: A Second Look at the New
Visibility Requirement, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 337, 345 (2010).
48. C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 960 (emphasis added).
49. Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 582 (B.I.A. 2008).
50. Id. at 584 (quoting Davila-Mejia v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 624, 628–29 (8th Cir. 2008)).
51. 26 I. & N. Dec. 208 (B.I.A. 2014), vacated in part, Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125 (9th
Cir. 2016).
52. 26 I. & N. Dec. 227 (B.I.A. 2014).
53. Id. at 240.
54. W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 216 (“[O]ur use of the word ‘visibility’ unintentionally
promoted confusion.”).
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particularity and immutability, as the three elements needed to establish
a cognizable particular social group.55 The BIA took pains in both
opinions to note that this three-part test was not a departure from Acosta;
it was simply a clarification of the meaning of “particular social group,”
a phrase that the BIA said had been given “more ‘concrete meaning
through a process of case-by-case adjudication.’”56
Importantly, however, this was not the only way in which the BIA
used the term “case-by-case,” even in those same opinions. Consider the
following, somewhat lengthy but hugely clarifying discussion in Matter
of M-E-V-G-:
[A] proposed social group composed of former employees
of a country’s attorney general may not be valid for asylum
purposes. Although such a shared past experience is
immutable and the group is sufficiently discrete, the
employees may not consider themselves a separate group
within the society, and the society may not consider these
employees to be meaningfully distinct within society in
general. Nevertheless, such a social group determination
must be made on a case-by-case basis, because it is possible
that under certain circumstances, the society would make
such a distinction and consider the shared past experience to
be a basis for distinction within that society.
The former employees of the attorney general may not be
considered a group by themselves or by society unless and
until the government begins persecuting them. . . . The act of
persecution by the government may be the catalyst that
causes the society to distinguish the former employees in a
meaningful way and consider them a distinct group, but the
immutable characteristic of their shared past experience
exists independent of the persecution.57
Notice an importantly different sense in which “case-by-case”
adjudication is being used here. Instead of saying either that the test for
particular social groups will be further specified case-by-case, or that
individual groups will be accepted or rejected group-by-group, here
“case-by-case” means that the cognizability of individual groups must be
relitigated anew in each new case.58 After all, a group such as “former
55. See M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 237.
56. Id. at 237 (quoting INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999)); W-G-R-, 26 I.
& N. Dec. at 212.
57. M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 242–43 (emphasis added).
58. Advocates and scholars have often conflated the different ways “case-by-case” gets
used. See, e.g., NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUST. CTR., PRACTICE ADVISORY: APPLYING FOR ASYLUM
AFTER MATTER OF A-B- 16 (2019), https://immigrantjustice.org/media/173/download
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employees of the attorney general” might have achieved social salience
in one country but not another, or—even more significantly—at one point
in time but not another. Factual differences at different places and times
might lead to different answers to the question of whether a particular
group is cognizable for asylum purposes.
The upshot of this variability across societies and times is that
particular social groups cannot be accepted or rejected categorically, once
and for all, as they had been under the Acosta test. As the BIA recognized
in Matter of M-E-V-G-, decisions that rejected social group claims by
Salvadoran youth who refused to join gangs, or Hondurans falsely
perceived to be gang members, “should not be read as a blanket rejection
of all factual scenarios involving gangs.”59 They cannot be so
categorically read since “[s]ocial group determinations are made on a
case-by-case basis.”60
The Attorney General passage from M-E-V-G- reveals why this is so.
In the example, it is a group’s social distinction that varies over time, as
the group’s persecution gives it a societal recognition that it previously
lacked. It is easy to imagine a group losing its salience over time as well.
(For instance, the Supreme Court’s solicitude for “hippies” in U.S.
Department of Agriculture v. Moreno61 can be mystifying to students
learning constitutional law almost fifty years later.) Either way, social
distinction adds a fact-specific variability that the Acosta test, looking
only at immutability, had previously lacked. Put another way, it made
sense for courts or the BIA to decide once and for all that homosexuality
is a trait that someone either cannot change or should not have to. That is
a question that can be answered categorically. But whether a given
society, at a given time, thinks of itself as carved up into groups like “gay”
or “straight” is a fact-bound question to which the answers might differ

[https://perma.cc/Y9G7-JC4J] (“[I]t is well established that adjudicators must evaluate asylum
claims on a case-by-case basis, paying close attention to the particular facts [and] evidence of the
individual case.”) (conflating Acosta, M-E-V-G-, and Pirir-Boc, among other cases); Kate Jastram
& Sayoni Maitra, Matter of A-B- One Year Later: Winning Back Gender-Based Asylum Through
Litigation and Legislation, 18 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 48, 61 n.53 (2020) (citing both Acosta
and M-E-V-G- for the notion that “social group cognizability is a case-by-case determination, so
a social group rejected in one case may still be viable under the facts and record of another case”);
Nora Snyder, Note, Matter of A-B-, LGBTQ Asylum Claims, and the Rule of Law in the U.S.
Asylum System, 114 NW. U. L. REV. 809, 835 (2019) (“A foundational principle of asylum law is
that asylum claims must be decided on a case-by-case basis.”) (citing Matter of Acosta, 19 I. &
N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A 1985)); see also infra notes 137–41, 166–67 and accompanying text
(discussing similar claims and citations in D.C. and Ninth Circuit cases).
59. M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 249–51.
60. Id. at 251.
61. 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
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in different places and times.62 The answer must be individualized—
offered case-by-case.
If immutability can be categorically determined but social distinction
must be determined case-by-case, where does that leave the third element
of the particular social group test—particularity? A full response will
have to wait for Section III.B; for now, it is worth flagging another
hypothetical that appears in the BIA’s 2014 social group opinions. “[I]n
an underdeveloped, oligarchical society, ‘landowners’ may be a
sufficiently discrete class to meet the criterion of particularity,” says ME-V-G-, “[h]owever, such a group would likely be far too amorphous to
meet the particularity requirement in Canada.”63 The example is
somewhat strange. Surely Canadians either are or are not landowners, just
like citizens of the oligarchy. Perhaps wealth would be a better example,
for “the wealthy” would demarcate something much more particular in a
society with a large gap between the rich and poor than it would in one
where all income brackets are filled and being “wealthy” is all relative.
Regardless, the point is that a group’s particularity, like its social
distinction, may be tied to “societal considerations”64 that are too factbound and variable to admit of categorical determination. Part III
explores further the extent to which this is true—and what should be said
about case-by-case adjudication as a result.
But first, Part II shows how often—and more confusedly—questions
about categorical versus case-by-case adjudication have arisen in the
recent rulemaking and litigation that together are fundamentally
reshaping some of the most crucial issues in asylum law.
II. CONFUSION ABOUT THE CATEGORICAL
The sweep of the Trump administration’s regulatory agenda related to
asylum law, the volume of litigation challenging it, and the Biden
administration’s early attempts to change course together make the
current moment easily the most transformative period since the modern
U.S. asylum system was put into place in 1980.65 Time and again,
categorical attempts to shut down certain types of asylum claims have
been met with an insistence that such claims be decided case-by-case.
Often, this resistance has been successful. But that does not mean it has
always been fully consistent. After all, certain groups have sometimes
62. See DAVID M. HALPERIN, ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF HOMOSEXUALITY 15 (1990)
(discussing the “invention of homosexuality” in the late nineteenth century).
63. M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 241; see also Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208,
214–15 (B.I.A. 2014) (offering the same example), vacated in part, Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d
1125 (9th Cir. 2016).
64. M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 241.
65. See Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2021

13

Florida Law Review, Vol. 73, Iss. 3 [2021], Art. 1

486

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73

gained categorical support for their claims, and in these cases it was the
Trump administration that pushed for more nuanced, individualized
consideration. There is an asymmetry here worth noting at the outset:
Categorically rejecting a particular social group dooms all group
members’ asylum claims, whereas categorically accepting a group—
finding it cognizable—does not automatically mean that group members
get asylum; it only means that asylum-seekers have the chance to prove
past or feared future persecution on the basis of their group membership.
The following sections describe how both types of categorical judgments
have played out in recent regulation and litigation concerning persecution
based on gender, gang, and family affiliation.
A. Regulatory Changes
In June 2020, the U.S. Departments of Homeland Security and Justice
(“the Departments” in what follows) jointly proposed what the union
representing federal asylum officers called the “most extreme in a recent
series of draconian changes to the American asylum process”: a rule that
would fundamentally remake and narrow U.S. asylum law. 66 After
receiving over 87,000 comments from the public, the Departments
published a final Rule in December 2020, having made only five
substantive changes, none relevant here.67 Many of the Rule’s 112 pages
of commentary and 16 pages of regulatory text are spent on procedural
reforms that would speed up the expedited removal process for
immigrants arriving in the United States without proper documentation,
bar refugees who might have applied for protection elsewhere on their
way to the United States, and expand the kinds of asylum applications
that can be penalized as frivolous.68
Most relevant here, though, are the Rule’s changes to the substantive
grounds for asylum—the standards governing what types of people and
situations U.S. asylum law covers. The Rule, in a section the initial draft
described as “provid[ing] clearer guidance to adjudicators regarding
whether an alleged group . . . is cognizable as a particular social group in
order to ensure . . . consistent consideration,”69 says that, “in general,”
groups will not be recognized if they are based on the following: past or
66. Zolan Kanno-Youngs, Asylum Officers Condemn What They Call ‘Draconian’ Plans
by Trump, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/15/us/politics/asylumofficers-trump.html [https://perma.cc/5TKH-XQZR] (discussing Procedures for Asylum and
Withholding of Removal, 85 Fed. Reg. 36,264 (June 15, 2020) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts.
208, 235, 1003, 1208, 1235)).
67. Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal, 85 Fed. Reg. 80,274 (Dec. 11,
2020) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 208, 235, 1003, 1208, 1235); see id. at 80,284 (noting the
number of comments); id. at 80,274–76 (discussing changes made).
68. Kanno-Youngs, supra note 66.
69. Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal, 85 Fed. Reg. 36,264, 36,278
(June 15, 2020) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 208, 235, 1003, 1208, 1235).
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present criminal, gang, terrorist, or persecutory activity, or recruitment
for such activity; presence in a country with a high-crime rate; “status as
an alien returning from the United States”; targeting by criminals because
of their perceived wealth; or criminal acts or interpersonal disputes “of
which governmental authorities were unaware or uninvolved.”70
Meanwhile, a parallel section on “[n]exus”—the “on account of” part
of the refugee definition—announces “eight nonexhaustive situations” in
which the Departments will, again “in general,” not find that persecution
is based on one of the statutory grounds.71 Most of these duplicate the
proscribed social groups, although the Rule does clarify that
“interpersonal animus” will not give rise to an asylum claim, especially
when the persecutor “has not targeted, or manifested an animus against,
other members of an alleged particular social group.”72 The Rule bars
claims based on “generalized . . . disagreement” with non-state actors,
such as gangs, unless the disagreement is “related to control of a State.”73
The Rule would also disallow claims arising from “persecution based
on . . . [g]ender”—at least “in general.”74
Though the Rule was finalized in the last months of the Trump
administration, President Biden released an Executive Order at the start
of his own term giving the Attorney General and Secretary of Homeland
Security 180 days to reexamine current asylum rules and decisions “to
evaluate whether the United States provides protection for those fleeing
domestic or gang violence in a manner consistent with international
standards”; within 270 days they are “to promulgate joint regulations,
consistent with applicable law, addressing the circumstances in which a
person should be considered a member of a ‘particular social group.’”75
The Biden administration’s review means that the parts of the December
2020 Rule might not be long for this world. But the Rule itself, and the
vast discussion it prompted, show how tricky the difference between
categorical and individualized decision-making can be—potentially for

70. Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal, 85 Fed. Reg. at 80,385 (emphasis
added).
71. Id. at 80,386.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. In the wake of Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737 (2020), which
clarified that actions taken because of sexual orientation and gender identity are necessarily taken
because of sex, I have argued that a rule prohibiting claims of persecution on account of gender
would also threaten to bar asylum claims by LGBTQ refugees. Brian Soucek, Comment Letter on
Proposed Rule on Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal, at 11–12 (June 29, 2020),
https://beta.regulations.gov/document/EOIR-2020-0003-3471 [https://perma.cc/YX95-2UK4].
The Trump administration did nothing to acknowledge, much less justify, these sweeping
implications of its Rule.
75. Exec. Order 14,010, 86 Fed. Reg. 8267, 8271 (Feb. 2, 2021).
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asylum advocates inside and outside of the Biden administration no less
than the asylum restrictionists who authored the Rule.
For an example of the confusion, consider how the preface to the
Proposed Rule acknowledged that “[f]ederal courts have raised questions
about whether the Board or the Attorney General can recognize or reject
particular social groups” by “announcing general rules of particular social
group definitions.”76 In fact, the two federal cases cited in the Proposed
Rule both did more than “raise[] questions.”77 The D.C. District Court
enjoined the Attorney General’s approach in Grace v. Whitaker,78 a case
about domestic violence claims that is discussed below.79 And Pirir-Boc
v. Holder,80 a 2014 Ninth Circuit opinion, unambiguously held that it
would be “error”81 to refuse to recognize a particular social group in a
given country without making a case-by-case determination:
To determine whether a group is a particular social group for
the purposes of an asylum claim, the agency must make a
case-by-case determination as to whether the group is
recognized by the particular society in question. To be
consistent with its own precedent, the BIA may not reject a
group solely because it had previously found a similar group
in a different society to lack social distinction or
particularity, especially where, as here, it is presented with
evidence showing that the proposed group may in fact be
recognized by the relevant society.82
Note the emphasis in this passage on the fact-specific nature of the
social distinction and particularity tests. As the history canvassed in Part
I explained, these are the prongs of the particular social group test that
necessitate case-by-case (re)consideration.
Instead of answering the “questions” it describes courts as raising, the
Proposed Rule instead just described how, in the first two decades after
Acosta, the BIA “routinely issued decisions delineating which groups did
and did not qualify as particular social groups in the context of the
relevant societies for purposes of asylum protection.”83 By counterposing
76. Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal, 85 Fed. Reg. 36,264, 36,278 n.27
(June 15, 2020) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 208, 235, 1003, 1208, 1235).
77. Id.
78. 344 F. Supp. 3d 96 (D.D.C. 2018), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Grace v. Barr,
965 F.3d 883 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
79. See infra Section II.C. This part of the district court’s opinion was reversed by the D.C.
Circuit, but only on the understanding that the general rule was not really a rule. See Grace v.
Barr, 965 F.3d at 906.
80. 750 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2014).
81. Id. at 1084 n.7.
82. Id. at 1084.
83. Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal, 85 Fed. Reg. 36,264, 36,278
(citing cases on Somali subclans and Cuban homosexuals).
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categorical social group determinations from the 1990s against more
recent judicial insistence on case-by-case adjudication, the implication
was that past practice had been contradictory, so the Trump
administration could do what it wanted. But there was no contradiction.
What the Trump administration failed to see is exactly what Part I
revealed: categorical adjudication became problematic only once the
particularity and social distinction tests were added. Note, for example,
how the passage above from Pirir-Boc ties case-by-case adjudication
solely to those tests. Before they came along, back when the Acosta test
stood alone, social groups could be accepted or rejected categorically
since the decision turned only on the immutability of the characteristics
uniting those groups. A trait like “homosexuality,” for example, could be
deemed immutable as a matter of law, once and for all. Not so for a
group’s particularity or, especially, its social distinction. Since these can
vary across societies and over time, determinations have to be made caseby-case. What the Proposed Rule treats as an unresolved tension in the
caselaw is simply a product of that caselaw’s evolution over time.
Procedural
requirements—individualized
versus
categorical
adjudication—follow developments in the underlying substantive
standards being adjudicated. In this case, by adding more criteria to the
social group test, the Board did not just raise the substantive bar for
asylum-seekers; ironically, it also raised the procedural requirements to
which the Board itself is now subject.
To see this is to realize that the government cannot now decide to
categorically reject certain social groups (such as those based on gender
or gang resistance) using the categorical decision-making of the 1990s as
its model. It cannot point to precedent about LGBTQ claims to support
new attempts to categorically exclude other kinds of claims. After all,
those earlier cases could operate categorically only because they were not
applying the current test, the individualized elements of which the Trump
administration’s Rule reaffirms.84
After public comments were received, the Trump administration
emphatically denied that it was acting categorically at all.85 As it had done
in recent litigation, described below,86 the Trump administration leaned
heavily on language in the Rule that says only that certain groups and
situations will not “in general” give rise to successful asylum claims.
Before turning to litigation, then, it is worth pausing to consider a few
points about the categorical nature of the Rule itself.
84. See Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal, 85 Fed. Reg. 80,274, 80,385
(Dec. 11, 2020) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 208, 235, 1003, 1208, 1235).
85. Id. at 80,314 (“The Departments also note again that the rule will not categorically
exclude the listed groups, rather it issues guidance that such groups will ‘generally’ not meet the
requirements of a cognizable particular social group ‘without more.’”).
86. See infra Sections II.C–D.
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First, although the Proposed Rule had noted courts’ resistance to
categorical decision-making, it did not indicate agreement, much less
capitulation. In fact, as just discussed, the Proposed Rule instead
emphasized past BIA cases where categorical determinations were
“routinely issued.”87
Second, the Departments’ best argument against treating the final
Rule’s bars as categorical is their allowance that, “in rare circumstances,”
“additional evidence” might provide “the basis for finding a particular
social group, given the fact- and society-specific nature of this
determination.”88 This qualification does not make it into the regulatory
text itself, however, and the discussion sections in the Proposed Rule and
Rule both lack any indication of what kinds of “additional evidence” or
“rare circumstances” might justify a departure from their otherwise
categorical guidance. Given that the guidance is meant to “reduce the
amount of time the adjudicators must spend evaluating such claims” and
lead to “more uniform application,”89 exceptions are surely meant to be
rare.
Finally, even if the Rule is understood as a series of generalizations or
predictions about certain claims’ likelihood of success, the Departments
do nothing to justify these generalizations. Take gender-based claims, for
example. To understand the Rule as a prediction about their likely failure,
rather than a categorical bar against them, one would need some reason
for thinking that only in “rare circumstances” will women be persecuted
on account of their gender.90 The Departments’ Rule gives no such
reason.91

87. Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal, 85 Fed. Reg. at 36,278.
88. Id. at 36,279.
89. Id.
90. Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal, 85 Fed. Reg. 80,274, 80,323,
80,324, 80,329, 80,334 (Dec. 11, 2020) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 208, 235, 1003, 1208,
1235). Recall that the general bar against gender-based asylum claims is placed in the “Nexus”
rather than “Membership in a Particular Social Group” section of the Rule. See id. at 80,386. The
Rule’s language thus would not technically affect the cognizability of women as a social group
but instead would suggest that, in general, one’s membership in that group is not a central reason
for one’s persecution. But see id. at 80,335 (purporting to answer this objection by stating: “The
Departments do not make any statement about the question or prevalence of gender-based harm
in other countries, but instead the point is that such harm is not on account of a protected ground
and accordingly generally fails to support a valid claim to asylum or to statutory withholding of
removal.”).
91. Worse, the Proposed Rule offers a single citation to support its exclusion of gender,
Niang v. Gonzalez, 422 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2005), a 2005 case that holds the exact opposite of
the proposition for which it is cited. For more on this point, see Soucek, Comment Letter, supra
note 74, at 6–7. The Departments’ response to this criticism appears in Procedures for Asylum
and Withholding of Removal, 85 Fed. Reg. at 80,334.
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B. Litigation About Gang-Based Claims
In July 2020, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
released a rare published opinion on an immigration matter, 92 sending a
particular social group case back to the BIA for more individualized
consideration. The petitioner, Mario Ordonez Azmen, had fled
Guatemala in 2003 after trying to leave the Mara 18 gang a year or two
earlier.93 Ordonez Azmen claimed asylum and withholding of removal
because of his fear of persecution targeting “former Mara 18 gang
members who lived in Guatemala.”94 The BIA denied the claim, relying
on Matter of W-G-R-, “a decision in which it had rejected as insufficiently
particular a proposed group of ‘former gang members in El Salvador who
have renounced their gang membership.’”95 The BIA, in other words,
treated its decision in W-G-R- as a categorical bar against Central
American gang claims.96
In Ordonez Azmen v. Barr,97 the Second Circuit followed W-G-R- in
defining “[p]articularity” to require that “members of society generally
agree on who is included in the group.”98 This, the court said, makes the
“particularity inquiry . . . closely tied to the society out of which the claim
arises.”99 This has an important implication: insofar as particularity is
society-specific, “the BIA may not reject a group solely because it had
previously found a similar group in a different society to
lack . . . particularity.”100
The Second Circuit was unsure whether the Board had made this
mistake in Ordonez Azmen. The BIA’s non-precedential opinion claimed
that “Guatemalans may not agree on how long one will be considered a
former gang member,”101 and it found no “meaningful distinction”
between Ordonez Azmen’s situation and that of the Salvadoran applicant
in W-G-R-, despite the fact that Ordonez Azmen submitted 200 pages of
additional country conditions evidence about the perceptions of his group

92. According to Westlaw, in 2019 the Second Circuit decided 204 petitions for review
from the BIA but published precedential opinions in only 13 (or 6%) of them.
93. Ordonez Azmen v. Barr, 965 F.3d 128, 132 (2d Cir. 2020).
94. Id. at 131, 134.
95. Id. at 134.
96. See id. at 135 (“The BIA rather appears to have imposed a general rule, untied to any
specific country or society, that groups consisting of ‘former gang members’ are insufficiently
particularized.”).
97. 965 F.3d 128 (2d Cir. 2020).
98. Id. at 135 (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec.
208, 221 (B.I.A. 2014)).
99. Id.
100. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Pirir-Boc v. Holder, 750 F.3d 1077, 1084 (9th Cir.
2014)).
101. Id.
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in Guatemalan society.102 The former observation, the Second Circuit
said, was error, for the question is what Guatemalan society does
“generally agree on,” not merely what it “‘may’ (or may not).”103
The latter issue—how to distinguish one case from another—is the
more difficult one—and it raises a number of important questions. First,
what exactly would it mean for the BIA to take seriously its own
requirement that social group determinations must be considered on a
case-by-case basis, particularly when tens of thousands of claims arise
from a short list of countries, all turning on the cognizability of similarly
or identically phrased social groups?
On the one hand, Ordonez Azmen’s fate should hardly depend on
what may have been less persuasive factual records assembled by the
former gang members who reached the BIA before him.104 Case-by-case
adjudication would be meaningless if later applicants cannot overcome
prior failures. On the other hand, when successive cases raise similar
claims and contain similar evidence, it is unclear how much the BIA
should be required to say to indicate to courts of appeal that the latest case
presents nothing meaningfully different than those that came before. One
lesson of Ordonez Azmen is that if the BIA just cites its own precedent
and claims the case before it is not meaningfully different, it may be
accused of applying “per se rules.”105
Another important question is what to make of precedential opinions
in particular social group cases that seem to reject specific groups—
“former gang members in El Salvador,” for example, or “gang resisters
in Honduras”? In subsequent cases, is the evidence about such groups’
particularity or social distinction really presented on a clean slate?106 Or
is there, in practice at least, a presumption against cognizability that needs
to be overcome? If the point is that more or better evidence is needed than
what was presented, say, in Matter of W-G-R-, subsequent litigants would
need to know what evidence had been presented there and what was
found wanting. W-G-R- mentions a report from a clinic at Harvard Law
School discussing tattoos, as well as a U.S. State Department country
report that lumps gang members and former gang members together in a
102. Id. at 133, 135.
103. Id. at 135 (internal quotation mark omitted).
104. See, e.g., Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892–93 (2008) (“A person who was not a
party to a suit generally has not had a ‘full and fair opportunity to litigate’ the claims and issues
settled in that suit. The application of claim and issue preclusion to nonparties thus runs up against
the ‘deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court.’” (quoting
Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793, 798 (1996))).
105. See Ordonez Azmen, 965 F.3d at 135.
106. Cf. Gonzales-Veliz v. Barr, 938 F.3d 219, 232 (5th Cir. 2019) (“As an adjudicatory
body, the BIA necessarily relies on established precedents to decide matters pending before it and
to avoid reinventing the wheel every time.”).
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statistic about prison populations.107 Ordonez Azmen’s 200 pages of
expert testimony and other evidence on societal perceptions in Guatemala
surely went further than this, but the BIA still found no meaningful basis
for coming out a different way.
All of this is complicated by the fact that Ordonez Azmen is from
Guatemala, while W-G-R- fled El Salvador. The Second Circuit
emphasizes this fact at several points in its opinion, expressing concern
that the BIA “appears to have imposed a general rule, untied to any
specific country or society.”108 And as already noted, it quotes the Ninth
Circuit in prohibiting a group’s rejection “solely because [the BIA] had
previously found a similar group in a different society to
lack . . . particularity.”109 This leaves open the possibility that the courts’
requirement of case-by-case decision-making does not refer to individual
cases so much as individual countries. Like the group-by-group
adjudication envisioned in Acosta, this would simply require adjudicators
to accept or reject groups on a society-by-society basis. The BIA would
only need to decide a Guatemalan counterpart to W-G-R- to categorically
exclude future gang-based social group claims from that country. This, to
be sure, would be a significantly weaker sense of case-by-case
adjudication than the truly individualized consideration most litigants
seem to assume is required. In Section III.A, this Article returns to
consider which notion of “case-by-case” makes the most sense.
The weaker version of “case-by-case” means that each group, in each
society, should be considered separately. The stronger version would
actually refer to each case: every applicant would have the chance to
prove her group’s particularity and social distinction in her country of
origin, unencumbered (or at least not precluded) by previous applicants’
attempts to do so. Importantly, both of these understandings of the “caseby-case” requirement turn on the notion that a group’s particularity, like
its social distinction, is a society-specific, fact-bound question.
But consider the problem the BIA identified with the particularity of
Ordonez Azmen’s asserted social group: it said the group was “‘too
loosely defined’ because ‘Guatemalans may not agree on how long one
will be considered a former gang member.’”110 This is absurd. Someone

107. Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 222 (B.I.A. 2014), vacated in part, Reyes v.
Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2016). The fact that the courts of appeals provide access to the
briefing in these cases and the underlying record only “at the courthouse,” FED. R. CIV. P.
5.2(c)(2); see FED. R. APP. P. 25(a)(5), makes it much harder to find out what evidence has proven
insufficient in the past.
108. Ordonez Azmen, 965 F.3d at 135.
109. Id. (second alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Pirir-Boc v. Holder, 750
F.3d 1077, 1084 (9th Cir. 2014)).
110. Id.
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either is or is not a former gang member.111 They do not age out of former
gang membership—that is why shared past experiences were offered in
Acosta as a paradigmatic example of immutability.112 It may be the case
that a person’s gang membership becomes so distant in time that potential
persecutors stop caring about it. But if so, that is a nexus issue: harm
would not then be inflicted on account of group membership. It is not a
problem with the group itself.
This misunderstanding of “particularity” is not unique to Ordonez
Azmen; it can be found in W-G-R- as well. There, the particularity of
former Mara 18 gang members in El Salvador was rejected “because it is
too diffuse, as well as being too broad and subjective. As described, the
group could include persons of any age, sex, or background. It is not
limited to those who have had a meaningful involvement with the
gang . . . .”113 The BIA draws a general conclusion from this:
[W]hen a former association is the immutable characteristic
that defines a proposed group, the group will often need to
be further defined with respect to the duration or strength of
the members’ active participation in the activity and the
recency of their active participation if it is to qualify as a
particular social group under the Act.114
Section III.B discusses all that is wrong with this. Not only does it
continue to confuse the existence of a particular social group with nexus,
but it also imposes a homogeneity requirement on social groups that does
not apply to other grounds like religion, race, or political opinion.
For present purposes, however, the crucial thing to note is that the
particularity problems just identified are not society-specific or even factbound in any meaningful way at all. There is no reason to believe that the
BIA’s claim about aging out of former gang membership would be any
111. Cf. Rivera-Barrientos v. Holder, 666 F.3d 641, 650 (10th Cir. 2012) (finding that even
“the past experience of having resisted gang recruitment can be a particularly defined trait,” in
contrast to more ambiguous traits like being middle class or lacking a stable family (emphasis
added)).
112. See Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985) (discussing “former
military leadership or land ownership” as examples of immutable shared characteristics that could
give rise to a particular social group), overruled in part by Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec.
439 (B.I.A. 1987).
113. Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 221 (B.I.A. 2014) (citation omitted), vacated
in part, Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2016).
114. Id. at 221–22. It is worth noting that the Ninth Circuit, in affirming this aspect of W-GR-, accepted the notion that grouping people who renounced their gang membership “regardless
of the length and recency of that membership” poses a particularity problem. Reyes, 842 F.3d at
1137–38. But, significantly, the Ninth Circuit’s deference to the BIA’s particularity test does not
extend to any understanding of particularity as a limit on either the size or diversity of potential
groups. Id. at 1135.
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different in Guatemala than in El Salvador, or that an expanded factual
record might change these conclusions.
In short, the BIA’s claims about particularity are conceptual, not
factual. Thus, case-by-case adjudication, in either the weaker or stronger
sense described above, is not going to lead to different or better results.
The BIA’s misunderstanding of its own particularity requirement not
only mangles the substantive test but also makes case-by-case application
of that test pointless. If particularity can be analyzed conceptually—say
by making armchair observations about how connection to one’s former
associations diminishes over time—then fact-bound, individualized
adjudication becomes unnecessary. Categorical judgments would be just
as acceptable as they were under Acosta’s immutability test.
C. Litigation About Gender-Based Claims
Worries about categorical determinations in social group cases work
both ways. While cases like Ordonez Azmen show applicants
complaining—successfully—about how their social group was
categorically rejected, other cases raise concerns about groups that seem
to have been categorically accepted for asylum purposes.
Take the decision by Attorney General Sessions in Matter of A-B-,115
later challenged in the D.C. District Court,116 then the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit under the name Grace v. Barr.117 The most
recent in decades of litigation and regulatory efforts concerning asylum
claims by victims of domestic violence,118 A-B- overturned a precedential
115. 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018), abrogated in part by Grace v. Barr, 965 F.3d 883
(D.C. Cir. 2020).
116. Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d 96, 105 (D.D.C. 2018), aff’d in part, rev’d in part
sub nom. Grace v. Barr, 965 F.3d 883.
117. 965 F.3d 883 (D.C. Cir. 2020). These cases are procedurally unusual, in that they depart
from the normal progression from Immigration Judge to Board of Immigration Appeals to Court
of Appeals. Instead, the Attorney General directed that a previous BIA decision, Matter of A-B-,
be referred to him for reconsideration. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1)(i) (2020); Grace v. Barr, 965
F.3d at 889. And because the substantive standards established in A-B- applied not just to ordinary
asylum proceedings but also the expedited removal system, plaintiffs in D.C. invoked 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(e)(3), which provides jurisdiction solely in that district for legal or constitutional
challenges to policy directives or guidelines governing expedited removal. See Grace v. Barr, 965
F.3d at 891–96.
118. See, e.g., R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 906 (B.I.A. 1999), vacated, 24 I. & N. Dec. 629
(A.G. 2008); Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588, 76,588 (proposed Dec.
7, 2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208); see also Joseph Landau, Bureaucratic
Administration: Experimentation and Immigration Law, 65 DUKE L.J. 1173, 1209–14 (2016)
(describing the bottom-up development of gender-based asylum claims from R-A- through Matter
of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388 (B.I.A. 2014)). In proposed rules that were never finalized, the
Clinton Administration “tentatively concluded” that a “case-by-case approach” to domestic
violence claims, guided by a statement of “broadly applicable principles,” “would be more useful
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BIA decision, Matter of A-R-C-G-,119 which had recognized “married
women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship” as a
particular social group.120
According to the Attorney General in A-B-, “Subsequent Board
decisions . . . read A-R-C-G- as categorically extending the definition of
a ‘particular social group’ to encompass most Central American domestic
violence victims.”121 Just as the BIA in Ordonez Azmen had found no
meaningful distinction between his gang-based claim and the one denied
in W-G-R-, so had the BIA in A-B- found that “El Salvadoran women who
are unable to leave their domestic relationships where they have children
in common” was “substantially similar” to the group it had approved in
A-R-C-G-.122 According to the Attorney General, this was error.123
But was the BIA’s error the categorical answer it reached or the fact
that its answer was categorical? Put another way: Attorney General
Sessions clearly found that “women who are unable to leave their
domestic relationships” cannot categorically count as a particular social
group; left unclear was whether that group is categorically uncognizable,
or if its cognizability simply cannot be determined categorically.
The ambiguity stems from statements in A-B- like this: “Had the
Board properly analyzed the issues [in A-R-C-G-], then it would have
been clear that the particular social group was not cognizable.”124 This
could be read as a blanket rejection, but it could also mean that the group
was not shown to be cognizable based on the evidence presented in that
particular case. Indeed, the Attorney General faults the BIA for failing in
its duty to evaluate “the existence of a particular social group in a
country . . . in the context of the evidence presented regarding the
particular circumstances in the country in question.”125 And a guidance
memo the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) issued to
explain Matter of A-B- stressed that asylum officers “must analyze each
case on its own merits in the context of the society where the claim

than simply announcing a categorical rule that a victim of domestic violence is or can be a
refugee.” Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,595. But see Jessica Marsden,
Note, Domestic Violence Asylum After Matter of L-R-, 123 YALE L.J. 2512, 2553 (2014) (calling
for a categorical rule).
119. 26 I. & N. Dec. 388 (B.I.A. 2014), overruled by A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018).
120. Id. at 388–89.
121. A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 332 (emphasis added); see id. at 339 (“[T]he Board recognized
a new category of asylum claims that did not satisfy the requirements set forth by the Board’s
precedent.” (emphasis added)).
122. Id. at 321, 332.
123. Id. at 317.
124. Id. at 334 (emphasis added).
125. Id. at 339 (omission in original) (quoting A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 392).
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arises.”126 The Attorney General’s ambiguous position in A-B- prefigured
and provided a model for that of the Rule discussed above. 127 Sweeping
beyond domestic violence claims, the Attorney General dictated—or
perhaps predicted—that:
Generally, claims by aliens pertaining to domestic violence
or gang violence perpetrated by non-governmental actors
will not qualify for asylum. While I do not decide that
violence inflicted by non-governmental actors may never
serve as the basis for an asylum or withholding application
based on membership in a particular social group, in practice
such claims are unlikely to satisfy the statutory grounds for
proving group persecution . . . .128
According to the Grace plaintiffs, challenging Matter of A-B- in the
District of Columbia, the opinion and guidance together “instruct asylum
officers to deny virtually all . . . claims based on domestic violence or
gang-related harms, in violation of the requirement that each case be
adjudged based on its specific facts.”129 Their Complaint alleged that the
Government had violated the Due Process Clause “by foreclosing their
claims regardless of their individual facts or merits”—which is to say, by
offering a categorical rule instead of case-by-case adjudication.130 The
district court did not reach the due process claim in Grace, but it did find
that A-B- set out a general rule, and that general rules that “effectively
bar[] . . . certain categories” of claims are inconsistent with U.S.
immigration law and treaty commitments, both of which the court
described (without citation) as requiring “case-specific factually
intensive analysis.”131
The Government’s response to the district court’s decision was
intriguing. On the one hand, it emphatically denied that Matter of A-Bestablished “any blanket rule against asylum claims involving harm by
gangs or domestic violence.”132 On the other, the Government insisted to
the D.C. Circuit that the BIA can and has “adopted policy rules in
interpreting ‘particular social group’”—including in 2008’s Matter of
126. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PM-602-0162,
GUIDANCE FOR PROCESSING REASONABLE FEAR, CREDIBLE FEAR, ASYLUM, AND REFUGEE CLAIMS
IN ACCORDANCE WITH MATTER OF A-B- 3 (2018).
127. See supra Section II.A.
128. A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 320 (emphases added) (footnote omitted).
129. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 7, at 21 (“[I]t is well
established that credible fear and asylum claims must be assessed on a case-by-case basis
according to the specific circumstances and evidence presented . . . .”).
130. Id. at 32.
131. Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d 96, 126 & n.14 (D.D.C. 2018), aff’d in part, rev’d
in part sub nom. Grace v. Barr, 965 F.3d 883 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
132. Brief for the Appellants, supra note 5, at 56.
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E-A-G-, which the Government described as “holding that particular
social groups cannot be based on gang membership.”133 In its Reply
Brief, the Government doubled down, claiming that the plaintiffs had no
answer to the fact that categorical rules about social groups were made in
the past.134 Moreover, the brief insisted that the Government would be
“harmed by” an injunction preventing it from “implementing general
rules concerning domestic or gang violence should it choose to” in the
future.135
The Grace plaintiffs were not alone in interpreting Matter of A-B- as
categorical. Sontos Maudilia Diaz-Reynoso, an indigenous woman who
fled abuse in Guatemala, argued to the Ninth Circuit in 2019 that:
A-B- amounts to a categorical ban on claims based on being
a domestic violence victim, a prohibition that runs counter
to a statutory scheme that otherwise imposes bars to asylum
and withholding only for applicants who are fugitives from
the law, perpetrators of humanitarian atrocities, or risks to
national security.136
In addition to this statutory argument, Diaz-Reynoso also claimed that
A-B-’s categorical rule violates the BIA’s “longstanding recognition that
particular social group determinations must be individualized.”137 Here,
she cited the case-by-case language of M-E-V-G-,138 the Ninth Circuit’s

133. Id. at 57 (quoting Matter of E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 591, 595–96 (B.I.A. 2008)). The
rule announced in E-A-G- is actually complicated. In regard to the group of “persons resistant to
gang membership,” the BIA held only that the applicant had not made a sufficient factual showing
to establish social visibility (as it was then called). E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 594. More
categorical was its claim about “young persons who are perceived to be affiliated with gangs”:
agreeing with the Ninth Circuit that gang membership cannot constitute a cognizable social group
because it would be “inconsistent with the principles underlying” the criminality bars elsewhere
in asylum law, see 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2), the BIA nonsensically extended that principle to
perceived—even incorrectly perceived!—gang membership. E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 595–96.
This is misguided because not all gang members have necessarily run afoul of asylum law’s bars
against those who have committed or been convicted of serious crimes, see 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii)–(iii), and of course there is no reason at all to think that people incorrectly
perceived to be gang members will have engaged in that sort of criminality.
134. Appellants’ Reply Brief, supra note 5, at 28.
135. Id. at 27–28 (“[T]he government is harmed by the district court’s advisory opinion about
a general rule that the district court invented and then relied upon to enjoin the government from
ever implementing general rules concerning domestic or gang violence should it choose to.
Indeed, Plaintiffs have no answer to the fact that the Board can and has adopted other general
rules applicable to what is a cognizable social group.”).
136. Petitioner’s Opening Brief at 24, Diaz-Reynoso v. Barr, 968 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2020)
(No. 18-72833) (quotation marks and emphasis omitted).
137. Id. at 27.
138. See supra notes 57–60 and accompanying text.
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opinion in Pirir-Boc,139 and Acosta.140 But as this Article has shown, one
of these citations is not like the other: “case-by-case” in Acosta really
refers to group-by-group adjudication, not individualized fact
determinations.141
The D.C. and Ninth Circuits responded to these arguments in the same
way.142 The courts both stressed the fact that A-B- spoke about domestic
violence (and gang-based) social group claims only “[g]enerally”143
failing to qualify, much like the Rule discussed above does too.144
According to the D.C. Circuit, “the record . . . does not support the
asylum seekers’ argument that USCIS and the Attorney General have
erected a rule against asylum claims involving allegations of domestic
and/or gang violence.”145 The Ninth Circuit concurred: “Despite the
general and descriptive observations set forth in the opinion, the Attorney
General’s prescriptive instruction is clear: the BIA must conduct the
proper particular social group analysis on a case-by-case basis.”146 In
both courts, the asylum-seekers wanted categorical decision-making
struck down; instead, the courts—perhaps aspirationally—read the
Attorney General’s decision as not categorical at all. The asylum-seekers
may have lost their claim but still have gotten what they wanted.
Things turned out differently in Gonzales-Veliz v. Barr,147 where the
Fifth Circuit was asked to review a BIA decision holding that the social
group presented—“Honduran women unable to leave their
relationship”—was similar enough to those in A-B- (“El Salvadoran [sic]
women who are unable to leave their domestic relationships where they
have children in common with their partners”) and A-R-C-G- (“married
women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship”) that it
too could be rejected as insufficiently particular and lacking in social
distinction.148 Affirming the BIA’s decision, the Fifth Circuit not only
139. See supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text
140. See supra notes 26–38 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 26–38 and accompanying text.
142. See Diaz-Reynoso v. Barr, 968 F.3d 1070, 1078–80, 1090 (9th Cir. 2020); Grace v.
Barr, 965 F.3d 883, 905–06 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
143. Diaz-Reynoso, 968 F.3d at 1079 (alteration in original) (quoting Matter of A-B-, 27 I.
& N. Dec. 316, 320 (A.G. 2018)); Grace v. Barr, 965 F.3d at 905 (quoting A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec.
at 320). Grace, which unlike Diaz-Reynoso, also reviewed the USCIS Guidance Memo on A-B-,
and observed that the memo referred to claims failing “[i]n general.” Grace v. Barr, 965 F.3d at
905 (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., supra note 126, at 6).
144. See supra Section II.A.
145. Grace v. Barr, 965 F.3d at 906.
146. Diaz-Reynoso, 968 F.3d at 1080 (“Matter of A-B- did not announce a bright-line rule
concerning applications based on domestic violence; in fact, it underscored the need for an
intensive case-by-case analysis.”).
147. 938 F.3d 219 (5th Cir. 2019).
148. Id. at 232; see Jastram & Maitra, supra note 58, at 61 (“[T]he court did not separately
assess the facts, evidence, or country in question in Gonzales-Veliz.”).
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concluded that the Attorney General had avoided categorical reasoning
in A-B-, but that the BIA had done so as well in Gonzales-Veliz’s case,
despite the fact that it relied solely on A-B- to find her group noncognizable.149 The BIA, it said, “did not blindly apply A-B- as a
categorical ban”; rather, “[a]s an adjudicatory body, the BIA necessarily
relies on established precedents to decide matters pending before it and
to avoid re-inventing the wheel every time.”150
As Ordonez Azmen revealed,151 the line between categorical rulefollowing and analogical reasoning from precedent can be hard to draw.
Part III returns to the question of how the case-by-case adjudication that
Matter of A-B- requires—at least according to the D.C., Fifth, and Ninth
Circuits—can be squared with precedential decision-making about the
cognizability of particular social groups.
D. Litigation About Circularity
A related debate has played out in courts of appeals across the country
in regard to a common way domestic violence claims have come to be
framed. Both A-R-C-G- and A-B-, recall, defined their particular social
group in terms of women “unable to leave” their intimate relationships.152
But as the Attorney General emphasized in A-B-, members of a particular
social group “must share a narrowing characteristic other than their risk
of being persecuted.”153
This requirement is sometimes framed as an additional criterion for
the cognizability of a social group.154 However, it is more properly
understood as a nexus problem—an issue with the “on account of” part
of the test for asylum. Persecutors do not target people on account of their
“risk of being persecuted.”155 If, say, Nazis start getting punched, this is
because they are Nazis, not because they are part of the group “people
punched by anti-fascists.”156 The latter group definition would lead to the
149. Gonzales-Veliz, 938 F.3d at 232 (“[T]he BIA never even stated that groups based on
domestic violence are categorically banned.”).
150. Id.
151. See supra Section II.B.
152. See supra notes 120, 122 and accompanying text.
153. Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 335 (A.G. 2018) (quoting Rreshpja v. Gonzales,
420 F.3d 551, 556 (6th Cir. 2005)), abrogated by Grace v. Barr, 965 F.3d 883 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
154. See, e.g., M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 237 n.11 (B.I.A. 2014) (“DHS’s proposed
test also included a separate requirement that the social group must exist independently of the fact
of persecution. However, this criterion is well established in our prior precedents and is already a
part of the social group analysis.”); Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 223 (B.I.A. 2014),
vacated in part, Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2016).
155. A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 335 (quoting Rreshpja, 420 F.3d at 556).
156. Cf. Diaz-Reynoso v. Barr, 968 F.3d 1070, 1093 (9th Cir. 2020) (Bress, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (explaining that “[d]efining [the] group by the harm” would cause the
nexus requirement to be satisfied in every case).
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circular claim that anti-fascists punch people because they are people
punched by anti-fascists.157
This clarification matters because acts of persecution can be part of a
group’s definition as long as they are not the very acts of persecution
group members flee and fear. So, for example, making someone a slave
would surely count as persecution. That persecution could, in turn, give
rise to a particular social group, enslaved people. Enslaved people might
then be targeted for further persecution by government and private actors
alike. If a slave were to claim a fear of assault, this might not involve any
circularity at all. The claim would not be that someone is targeted for
enslavement because they are enslaved but rather that the enslaved person
fears assault or similar harms directed at those seen as slaves.
This Article previously showed another way persecution might affect
a group’s cognizability. Recall the former employees of a country’s
attorney general who were never noticed by society as a distinct or salient
group until they started getting persecuted.158 Persecution might be what
gives a group social distinction; however, the group itself—former
employees of the attorney general—is defined without reference to the
persecution, so there is no circularity problem.159 This point requires
belaboring only because it is so widely misunderstood in the litigation
over circularity that has arisen in domestic violence asylum cases.
The USCIS Guidance Memo applying Matter of A-B- stated that
women who claim an inability to leave their relationships due to the
violence of their persecutors are “circularly defining the particular social
group by the harm on which the asylum claim was based.”160 “Such a
formulation would generally not share a ‘narrowing characteristic other
than their risk of being persecuted’”—in other words, a group defined
that way would generally fail to qualify for asylum.161 According to the
plaintiffs and district court in Grace,162 as well as the petitioners in recent

157. See Sarkisian v. Att’y Gen., 322 F. App’x 136, 141 (3d Cir. 2009) (“This is a matter of
logic: motivation must precede action; and the social group must exist prior to the persecution if
membership in the group is to motivate the persecution.”).
158. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (quoting M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 242–
43).
159. See M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 243 (“[T]he immutable characteristic of their shared
past experience exists independent of the persecution.”). Cf. Diaz-Reynoso, 968 F.3d at 1093
(Bress, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
160. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., supra note 126, at 5.
161. Id. (quoting Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 335 (A.G. 2018)).
162. Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d 96, 133 (D.D.C. 2018), aff’d in part, rev’d in part
sub nom. Grace v. Barr, 965 F.3d 883 (D.C. Cir. 2020); Brief for the Appellees at 53, Grace v.
Barr, 965 F.3d 883 (No. 19-5013) (“Because assessment of whether a social group definition is
circular is necessarily a fact-bound inquiry, the Guidance was wrong to assume that ‘inability to
leave’ a relationship is always the same as the feared harm.”).
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cases in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First,163 Fifth,164 and Ninth165
Circuits, this passage amounted to a categorical determination that a
social group defined as “women unable to leave their relationships” was
impermissibly circular. The plaintiffs in Grace argued that the Guidance
Memo’s “blanket assumption is incompatible with the required case-bycase analysis,”166 citing and conflating the same, disparate mix of cases
Diaz-Reynoso cited to the Ninth Circuit.167
Plaintiffs’ and petitioners’ substantive argument was that women may
be unable to leave their relationships for a variety of reasons, not just
because of their partner’s violence.168 Legal or religious limits on divorce,
the social inequality of women, or community pressures all might keep
women from leaving their abusers.169 The First, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits
agreed that case-by-case adjudication was therefore necessary to
determine whether the social group definition in any particular case
proves circular.170 This, however, required the D.C. Circuit to disregard
(and discredit) the more categorical claims government lawyers had
made.171 And the First and Ninth Circuits both faulted (and remanded
their cases back to) the BIA for its failure to conduct “the case-specific
inquiry demanded by Matter of A-B-.”172 According to the First Circuit,
the BIA “must have viewed the circularity objection as categorical; i.e.,
that any group defined by its members’ inability to leave a relationship
must be insufficient.”173 This, it said, was error.174
Meanwhile, the Fifth Circuit in Gonzales-Veliz needed only two
sentences to decide that “[a]s in A-R-C-G- and A-B-, ‘Honduran women
unable to leave their relationship’ is impermissibly defined in a circular
163. De Pena-Paniagua v. Barr, 957 F.3d 88, 93 (1st Cir. 2020).
164. Gonzales-Veliz v. Barr, 938 F.3d 219, 232 (5th Cir. 2019).
165. Diaz-Reynoso v. Barr, 968 F.3d 1070, 1086 (9th Cir. 2020).
166. Brief for the Appellees, supra note 162, at 54.
167. See supra notes 137–141 and accompanying text.
168. Brief for the Appellees, supra note 162, at 53–54.
169. See Grace v. Barr, 965 F.3d 883, 904 (D.C. Cir. 2020); De Pena-Paniagua v. Barr, 957
F.3d 88, 93–94 (1st Cir. 2020) (“We therefore do not see any basis other than arbitrary and
unexamined fiat for categorically decreeing without examination that there are no women in
Guatemala who reasonably feel unable to leave domestic relationships as a result of forces other
than physical abuse.”); Diaz-Reynoso, 968 F.3d at 1087 (noting that petitioner’s inability to leave
could be due to “financial dependence on her husband, limited education, rural location, and an
ingrained Mayan cultural view that a relationship does not end until the man so agrees”).
170. Grace v. Barr, 965 F.3d at 904 (“In short, whether a given group is circular depends on
the facts of the particular case.”); De Pena-Paniagua, 957 F.3d at 94; Diaz-Reynoso, 968 F.3d at
1086.
171. Grace v. Barr, 965 F.3d at 905 (citing government counsel’s acknowledgement at oral
argument that its briefing had been inaccurate and that groups of women unable to leave their
relationships are “not categorically barred”).
172. Diaz-Reynoso, 968 F.3d at 1088; see De Pena-Paniagua, 957 F.3d at 94.
173. De Pena-Paniagua, 957 F.3d at 93.
174. Id.
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manner.”175 Presumably finding those precedents indistinguishable, the
Fifth Circuit was once again happy to allow the BIA to avoid “reinventing
the wheel every time.”176
Putting the Fifth Circuit aside, the courts that insisted on case-by-case
adjudication once again found that it was needed because of the substance
of whatever was being adjudicated. When circularity is under
consideration, adjudicators may need to conduct a factual investigation
into what is causing a woman’s entrapment. Only then can they decide,
case-by-case, whether “women who cannot leave their relationships” is a
group defined in terms of persecution, and therefore circular.
Notice, however, that were the social group defined differently, caseby-case adjudication of circularity might not be required. For instance, if
the group asserted were “Guatemalan women who cannot leave their
relationship because of cultural norms,” adjudicators could say
categorically that this definition is not circular.177 In that case, social
norms rather than the persecutor’s abuse is what is said to trap women in
their relationships. The lesson here is that categorical claims about
circularity—unlike, say, those about social distinction—are not
inherently impermissible. Case-by-case adjudication means something
different in those two contexts: whereas social distinction questions are
fact-bound and thus may need to be considered anew in each case,
circularity analysis needs to remain open-ended only because certain
group definitions—like women unable to leave their relationships—
admit of multiple interpretations, not all of which can be foreclosed at
once.
Judge Daniel Bress of the Ninth Circuit, dissenting in DiazReynoso,178 recognized this point—although he disagreed with his
colleagues about what prevented Diaz-Reynoso herself from being able
to leave her relationship. As Judge Bress put it: “Whether the anticircularity rule applies is determined on a case-by-case basis by
examining the proposed social group that an applicant brings forward.
But when the rule does apply, it is, indeed, a categorical one.”179 Again,
the lesson is that case-by-case adjudication is not a general due process
or even statutory necessity; rather, it is an imperative that stems from the
nature of the thing being adjudicated.
E. Litigation About Family-Based Claims
The Attorney General’s opinion in A-B- was prompted by what he saw
as an impermissibly categorical acceptance of domestic violence claims
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

938 F.3d 219, 232 (5th Cir. 2019) (emphasis added).
Id.
See Grace v. Barr, 965 F.3d 883, 904 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
968 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2020).
Id. at 1096 (Bress, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
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in the BIA’s opinion in Matter of A-R-C-G-.180 But according to the
plaintiffs in Grace, Matter of A-B- overcorrected, acting categorically in
the other direction.181
A similar dynamic has played out in another important area of asylum
law—that governing claims based on persecution directed at individual
families. In 1985, the BIA said in Acosta that “kinship ties” were among
the paradigmatically immutable characteristics that could establish a
particular social group.182 Then, in 2006, the BIA said in Matter of C-A-183
that “[s]ocial groups based on innate characteristics such as . . . family
relationship are generally easily recognizable and understood by others
to constitute social groups.”184 And in 2017, in Matter of L-E-A-,185 the
BIA accepted as a particular social group the “‘immediate family of [LE-A-’s] father,’ who owned a store targeted by a local drug cartel.”186 By
then, nearly every court of appeals had found family-based groups to be
cognizable,187 with some referring to families as the “prototypical”188 or
“quintessential particular social group.”189
In 2019, Attorney General William Barr reversed the social group
determination in L-E-A-, casting aside conflicting circuit precedent either
as “outdated,”190 dicta,191 or—most relevantly here—as inappropriately
“categorical.”192 Since Acosta, the Attorney General wrote, “the Board
has emphasized that a ‘particular social group’ must be particular and
socially distinct in the society at question, which itself requires a factspecific inquiry based on the evidence in a particular case.”193 Note that
the necessity of case-by-case adjudication is tied here—as this Article
argues it should be—to the social distinction and particularity prongs of
the social group test, not the immutability criterion.

180. Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 346 (A.G. 2018), abrogated in part by Grace v.
Barr, 965 F.3d 883 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
181. Brief for the Appellees, supra note 162, at 13–14.
182. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled in part by Matter
of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987).
183. 23 I. & N. Dec. 951 (B.I.A. 2006).
184. Id. at 959.
185. 27 I. & N. Dec. 581 (A.G. 2019).
186. Id. at 581.
187. Recent Adjudication, Asylum Law—Particular Social Group—Attorney General
Overrules Finding of Family as a Social Group—Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 581 (Att’y
Gen. 2019), 133 HARV. L. REV. 1500, 1505 (2020).
188. Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117, 125 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting SanchezTrujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986)).
189. Rios v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 2015).
190. L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 590.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 591.
193. Id.
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Having found categorical acceptance of family-based social groups to
be inappropriate, the Attorney General instead required that, to be
cognizable, nuclear families must not only be generally salient types of
units in society, but the applicant’s specific family unit must also be set
apart and socially recognized.194 The Kennedys and the Kardashians may
be cognizable social groups in our society, in other words, though the
Souceks, for better or worse, are not.
The Attorney General emphasized that L-E-A- “does not bar all
family-based social groups from qualifying for asylum.”195 But that is not
how plaintiffs described his ruling when they challenged it in the D.C.
District Court, using the same jurisdictional hook as Grace.196 “Despite
the Attorney General’s stated adherence to the principle of case-by-case
adjudication,” the plaintiffs in S.A.P. v. Barr197 alleged, “he nonetheless
made several statements in dicta suggesting that family-based groups
usually will not meet the social distinction requirement for PSGs.”198 This
“unlawful presumption against family-based PSGs, arbitrarily departing
from decades of agency guidance requiring an individualized, fact-based,
case-by-case social group analysis,”199 was said to violate federal
immigration law as well as the Due Process Clause.200
Given the D.C. Circuit’s refusal to treat a general presumption as a
categorical bar in Grace, it now seems unlikely that the plaintiffs in S.A.P.
will be able to convince courts that L-E-A- operates categorically,
violating what they describe as a statutory or even constitutional right to
individualized adjudication of their family-based social group claims. To
be sure, the Attorney General, in L-E-A-, made family-based claims much
harder to win. Raising the substantive legal standard will always lead to
a loss for a certain category of claimants: those whose claims fall between
the old standard and the new. But this is not because the adjudication of
their cases has become less individualized.
There is an irony in the fact that plaintiffs in S.A.P., whose families
were, but no longer are, categorically recognized as particular social
groups, should now fault the Attorney General for being overly
categorical in rejecting their groups. But their claim raises an important
question: Does the demand for case-by-case rather than categorical
decision-making operate symmetrically? In other words, might there be
questions in asylum law that can be answered categorically in favor of
194. Id. at 594.
195. Id. at 595.
196. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1, 23, S.A.P. v. Barr, No. 19-cv03549 (D.D.C. Nov. 25, 2019).
197. No. 19-cv-03549 (D.D.C. filed Nov. 25, 2019).
198. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 196, at 20.
199. Id. at 34.
200. Id. at 34–36.
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protection, but which have to be individually assessed when denying
applicants’ claims? Perhaps it was fine for the BIA or the courts to declare
nuclear families to be categorically (or presumptively) cognizable as
particular social groups, whereas a categorical, or even presumptive,
rejection of such groups would raise concerns of a different sort.201
Section III.D takes up this question below.
The DOJ’s insistence in Grace that it can and has made categorical
rules regarding social groups is in significant tension with the Attorney
General’s outrage in L-E-A- about judges recognizing family-based
claims across the board. But there is tension too in asylum advocates’
demands for case-by-case adjudication of issues that they were formerly
happy to have categorically resolved in their favor.
This Part has distinguished several ways and contexts in which “caseby-case” adjudication gets invoked, not always consistently. With those
in mind, Part III can now provide a prescriptive account of when and what
types of case-by-case adjudication is necessary in asylum law.
III. PROPERLY CATEGORIZING THE CATEGORICAL AND
THE CASE-BY-CASE
Time and again, the Trump administration and its opponents both
insisted on the need for case-by-case adjudication of asylum claims
while, at other times, enjoyed (and tried to protect) the benefits of
categorical decisions about whom asylum law protects. In documenting
confusions and contradictions on this issue, Part II issued a series of
promissory notes—questions pushed off to this Part about when case-bycase adjudication is necessary and, when so, what it should entail.
The main lesson that has emerged so far is that case-by-case
adjudication is necessary (or not) based solely on the nature of the thing
being adjudicated. Basic as this may sound, it is a lesson repeatedly
misunderstood in the regulatory and litigation efforts described in Part II.
And the lesson’s implications are important.
For one thing, it follows that the problem with categorical
adjudication—to the extent there is one—does not stem from some
abstract principle like the Due Process Clause, despite what advocates
sometimes allege.202 There is no constitutional requirement that the
various elements of an asylum-seeker’s claim can only be rejected (or for
that matter, accepted) on an individualized rather than categorical basis.
In fact, there is not even a statutory requirement prohibiting the sort of
categorical judgments contested in the cases described above.

201. See infra Section III.C.
202. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 7, at 32; Complaint for
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 196, at 35–36.
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Perhaps that is why there is no citation after the claim by the district
court in Grace that a general rule against domestic violence or gangbased claims would “run[] contrary to the individualized analysis
required by the INA.”203 The opinion does go on to cite a regulation
requiring asylum officers to create a written record summarizing the
particular facts in each expedited removal case.204 But the necessity of
hearing each applicant’s particular factual story is in no way incompatible
with applying categorical rules to those facts. (Officials at the Department
of Motor Vehicles might be required to look at the birth certificate of
every aspiring driver who comes to the office, but that does not mean they
cannot reject everyone under a designated age.) The fact that certain
aspects of asylum claims are necessarily particularized—an applicant’s
subjective fear of persecution, for example205—does not mean that
general rules cannot be applied to other aspects of the decision.
In the discussion above, the most promising statutory argument
against categorical adjudication of social group claims was the one
offered in Diaz-Reynoso, the Ninth Circuit domestic violence case.206 The
claim there was that federal law enumerates specific categorical bars to
asylum and withholding of removal—for example, bars against terrorists
or people who have persecuted others.207 Were the Attorney General or
BIA to add additional categorical restrictions—against victims of
domestic violence, say, or former gang members—this would subvert the
statutory scheme Congress enacted. As Diaz-Reynoso put it, Congress
barred certain criminals from asylum, not victims of criminality like
her.208
Unfortunately, this argument proves too much. It would make every
precedential decision limiting the meaning of the phrase “membership in
a particular social group” into an illicit addition to the statutory asylum
bars. Take Acosta, the first such decision: after it established the
203. Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d 96, 126 (D.D.C. 2018), aff’d in part, rev’d in part
sub nom. Grace v. Barr, 965 F.3d 883 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
204. See id.; 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(e)(1) (2020) (“The asylum officer shall create a written record
of his or her determination, including a summary of the material facts as stated by the applicant,
[and] any additional facts relied on by the officer . . . .”).
205. See David A. Martin, Reforming Asylum Adjudication: On Navigating the Coast of
Bohemia, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1247, 1271 (1990) (discussing the “individualized inquiry”
ordinarily required under asylum law’s “‘well-founded fear’ standard”).
206. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
207. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2) (stating that an alien is not eligible for asylum if “the
alien ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion”); id. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(i) (stating that an alien can be deported to a country where his or
her life or freedom would be threatened if “the alien ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise
participated in the persecution of an individual because of the individual’s race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion”).
208. Petitioner’s Opening Brief, supra note 136, at 24.
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immutability requirement, it held that being a taxi driver is not an
immutable characteristic and thus cannot serve as the basis for asylum.209
The argument in Diaz-Reynoso would treat this as an addition to the
statutory bars to asylum. (No criminals, terrorists, or taxi drivers . . . .)
But it is not; it is an interpretation that fleshes out another part of the
statute, namely its ambiguous language about social groups.210
If the categorical decision to reject asylum claims from taxi drivers is
wrong, the problem is not that the decision is categorical. The error would
be substantive: a misunderstanding of how people’s jobs might be
“fundamental to their individual identities,” something they “should not
be required to change.”211 The BIA might have misapplied its
immutability standard, but the result would have been categorical even if
it had come out the other way. That is just the nature of immutability,
which is the substantive test being applied. Saying no to a group on this
basis is no more akin to an additional statutory bar than saying yes (as in
the BIA’s case about gay men212) would have been akin to adding another
ground to the five listed in the statute.213
This once again reinforces this Article’s main lesson: whether
categorical adjudication is proper depends solely on the nature of the
thing being adjudicated. Arguments against categorical adjudication in
asylum law turn out to be substantive, not procedural. Making
precedential decisions that affect entire groups of potential asylees is not
inherently wrong. It is wrong only if the decisions turn on a substantive
standard that itself requires individualized application.
When it comes to particular social group claims, the biggest flashpoint
in current fights over the future of asylum law, one needs to look closely
at the individual tests that have evolved—tests for immutability, social
distinction, particularity, anti-circularity, and nexus—to determine which
allow for categorical rather than case-by-case results. It is not helpful to
ask whether victims of domestic violence can be categorically excluded
from asylum. Instead, one must ask which test leads to the exclusion, for
the categorical or particularized nature of the test will determine the
permissibility of a categorical rather than case-by-case exclusion.
209. See Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 234 (B.I.A. 1985) (“It may be unfortunate
that the respondent . . . would have had to change his means of earning a living . . . in order to
avoid their threats. However, the internationally accepted concept of a refugee simply does not
guarantee an individual a right to work in the job of his choice.”), overruled in part by Matter of
Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987).
210. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42); see also Diaz-Reynoso v. Barr, 968 F.3d 1070, 1092 (9th
Cir. 2020) (stating that “particular social group” is an ambiguous term and that the BIA is entitled
to Chevron deference in its interpretation).
211. Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233. One might wonder whether the BIA would have been
as dismissive of a job-based claim from an artist, a professor, or a lawyer.
212. See Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819, 822 (B.I.A. 1990).
213. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).
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This Part considers these criteria one by one, determining to what
extent each can be categorically applied. It then goes on to ask whether
this Article’s prescriptions about asylum adjudication apply
symmetrically, both to asylum-seekers and the government, expansions
and restriction of protection, alike.
A. Immutability and Social Distinction
The immutability criterion and the later-added social distinction test
for particular social groups provide the easiest cases of categorical and
case-by-case adjudication, respectively. Despite the government’s
confusion on this point (described in Section II.A), Part I showed how
routinely the courts and BIA approved or rejected social groups
categorically in the years after Acosta, when immutability was the only
explicit requirement. In fact, as this Article has shown, “case-by-case” in
Acosta really meant “group-by-group”: the Board envisioned a gradual
accumulation of caselaw clarifying what groups would categorically
qualify as “particular social groups” for asylum purposes.214
By contrast, social distinction is, as the BIA recognized from the
beginning, a fact-intensive, society-specific determination about what
groups are socially salient at a given time and place.215 This Article need
not belabor the point, made already, that even if traits like sex or sexual
orientation are recognized categorically as immutable,216 societies might
not always and everywhere have thought of themselves as carved up into
groups defined by sexuality.217 That is why case-by-case adjudication of
social distinction is needed. Determining whether a group such as “Cuban
homosexuals” is cognizable requires adjudicators to delve into the
specifics of Cuban society at a given point in history. The variability of a
group’s social distinction across time and place prevents that test from
being answered categorically, once and for all.
That said, there are three points about the particularized nature of the
social distinction test that need to be explored. First, Section II.B drew a
distinction between a weaker and stronger sense in which social
distinction might be determined “case-by-case.” The weaker one derives
from the BIA’s and courts’ emphasis on the “context of the country of
214. See supra notes 26–38 and accompanying text.
215. See Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 586–87 (B.I.A. 2008) (“The question
whether a proposed group has a shared characteristic with the requisite ‘social visibility’ must be
considered in the context of the country of concern . . . .”); cf. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N.
Dec. 227, 251 (B.I.A. 2014) (noting that S-E-G- “should not be read as a blanket rejection of all
factual scenarios involving gangs”).
216. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 657–58 (2015) (recognizing the
“immutable nature” of gays and lesbians); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973)
(plurality opinion) (“[S]ex, like race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic
determined solely by the accident of birth . . . .”).
217. See supra text accompanying note 62.
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concern.”218 “Case-by-case” here really means “society-by-society.” In
other words, group-based decisions could be made, but new precedential
decisions would be required for each country. Honduran women unable
to leave their relationships could not be bound by a decision about a
woman in Guatemala, but Guatemalan women presumptively would be.
The better understanding of “case-by-case” is probably the stronger
reading, according to which every applicant gets their own bite at the
social distinction apple. This understanding is better for two reasons. For
one, it is more sensitive to societal changes over time—the kind of
evolution in a group’s social salience that the BIA itself has described.219
The weak version of case-by-case adjudication is likely to lock in
whatever society-specific answers it arrives at. Being forced to consider
the question afresh case-by-case, not just society-by-society, might help
keep this from happening.
The other advantage of the stronger reading is based in the due process
notion that everyone deserves their day in court.220 It would be unfair if
the first, say, gang opponent from Honduras were to do a poor job
presenting evidence of his group’s social distinction in that country,
leading to a precedential opinion that binds better-counseled Honduran
gang opponents who happen to arrive later. For this reason, “case-bycase” should mean that when it comes to social distinction, decisions
must be made based on the particular evidence offered in that case.
But, second, if this is so, how are courts and agency officials to treat
cases arising from similar situations? Does the BIA need to “reinvent[]
the wheel,” as the Fifth Circuit put it,221 with each new case? That court
approved a BIA decision in which it treated the domestic violence claim
before it as “substantially similar” to those decided in Matter of
A-R-C-G- and A-B-.222 The Second Circuit, meanwhile, sent back a case
where the Board had found no “meaningful distinction” between it and
W-G-R-, an earlier, precedential decision on gangs in a neighboring
country.223 The Ninth Circuit similarly admonished the BIA recently,
writing that “[t]here are no shortcuts” when it comes to case-by-case
adjudication.224
218. S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 586–87; see also supra notes 108–09 and accompanying text
(discussing Ordonez Azmen v. Barr, 965 F.3d 128 (2d Cir. 2020)).
219. See M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 242–43. Recall the example of the former employees
of a country’s attorney general.
220. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327 n.7 (1979) (“It is a violation of
due process for a judgment to be binding on a litigant who was not a party or a privy and therefore
has never had an opportunity to be heard.”).
221. Gonzales-Veliz v. Barr, 938 F.3d 219, 232 (5th Cir. 2019).
222. Id. at 230–31.
223. Ordonez Azmen, 965 F.3d at 135, 140 (2d Cir. 2020).
224. Diaz-Reynoso v. Barr, 968 F.3d 1070, 1087 (9th Cir. 2020).
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It is unrealistic, given the volume of claims, to think that the BIA or
immigration judges will start with a blank slate each time. But when it
comes to social distinction, case-by-case adjudication must at least mean
that the result in case one cannot be the reason for the result in case two.
Of course, if the evidence presented in the two cases were the same, the
same decision can (and probably should) result. Judges could copy and
paste or, better, incorporate by reference, the reasoning of their prior
opinion.225 But when new evidence is presented, new reasoning is
required. So, for example, in Ordonez Azmen, the 200 supplemental pages
of evidence about how former gang members are perceived in Guatemala
needed to be considered and acknowledged, and the BIA should have
explained what remained lacking.226 Without this, it is hard to see how
the BIA was doing anything other than following “per se rules”227 about
what groups qualify—the very thing the Attorney General rejected as
impermissibly categorical in Matter of A-B-.228
Third, it is important to note that the necessity of case-by-case
adjudication of the social distinction criterion hinges on a correct
understanding of what social distinction means. Before 2014, when the
requirement was still referred to as “social visibility,” judges often
interpreted visibility literally.229 This was a substantive mistake, now
officially corrected,230 but consider its implications for case-by-case
versus categorical adjudication. If social visibility/distinction really did
come down to whether groups were recognizable on sight, adjudicators
might legitimately have decided categorically that, say, confidential
informants231 or people who are HIV-positive232 were insufficiently
visible. These are questions judges could answer once and for all.
Here again, the permissibility of categorical adjudication depends
entirely on the substance of the thing being adjudicated. Perhaps one
reason courts have been so suspicious of even hints of categorical
adjudication by the BIA is because it might suggest that its members are
225. For a discussion about the dangers posed by unacknowledged copying-and-pasting in
asylum opinions, see generally Brian Soucek, Essay, Copy-Paste Precedent, 13 J. APP. PRAC. &
PROCESS 153 (2012).
226. See Ordonez Azmen, 965 F.3d at 133.
227. Id. at 135.
228. See Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 339 (A.G. 2018), abrogated in part by Grace
v. Barr, 965 F.3d 883 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
229. Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 211 (B.I.A. 2014) (“Contrary to our intent, the
term ‘social visibility’ has led some to believe that literal, that is, ‘ocular’ or ‘on-sight,’ visibility
is always required for a particular social group to be cognizable under the Act.”), vacated in part,
Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2016); Soucek, supra note 47, at 338.
230. See W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 212.
231. See Matter of C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 960 (B.I.A. 2006).
232. See Rodriguez v. Att’y Gen., 381 F. App’x 217, 219 (3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (noting
the immigration judge’s finding that “it is unlikely that anyone would be able to tell from looking
at [Rodriguez] that he is HIV positive”).
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misunderstanding the substantive requirements being applied. This, as
Section III.B argues, is precisely what seems to be happening when it
comes to particularity.
B. Particularity
According to Matter of M-E-V-G-, the particularity requirement
demands that terms used to describe a particular social group “have
commonly accepted definitions” within the relevant society and “provide
a clear benchmark for determining who falls within the group.”233 “The
group must also be discrete and have definable boundaries—it must not
be amorphous, overbroad, diffuse, or subjective.”234 Traits that fail this
test, according to the BIA, include wealth, poverty, homelessness, and
youth235—traits inconsistently described both as “too vague”236 and too
“all encompassing.”237
Notice the different directions the BIA’s adjectives point: a group that
has amorphous, vague, or overly subjective boundaries is notably
different than one that is overbroad, diffuse, or all encompassing—which
is to say, too big or diverse.238 To be “narrowly defined”239 is something
other than being sharply defined. An example of one group that would
meet the latter but not the former test is women.
Significantly, when the Ninth Circuit granted Chevron deference to
the BIA’s particularity standard in 2016, it did so with the express proviso
that the requirement does not “disqualify groups that exceed specific
breadth or size limitations” or because of the “diversity within a proposed
particular social group.”240 And yet it said all this while reviewing Matter
of W-G-R-, where the groups “former members of the Mara 18 gang in El
Salvador who have renounced their membership” and “deportees from
the United States to El Salvador” were both rejected as insufficiently
particular.241 The gang-based claim was problematic, the BIA said,
233. Matter of M-E-V-G, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 239 (B.I.A. 2014).
234. Id.
235. Id. at 239–40.
236. Id. at 240 (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Escobar v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d
363, 368 (3d Cir. 2005)).
237. Id. (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Escobar, 417 F.3d at 368).
238. Id. at 239 (citing Ochoa v. Gonzales, 406 F.3d 1166, 1170–71 (9th Cir. 2005), for the
proposition that “a particular social group must be narrowly defined and that major segments of
the population will rarely, if ever, constitute a distinct social group”); Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. &
N. Dec. 208, 214 (B.I.A. 2014) (same), vacated in part, Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir.
2016). Insofar as Ochoa rejected social groups based on the diversity of their membership, that
holding does not survive Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081, 1093–94 (9th Cir. 2013) (en
banc).
239. M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 239.
240. Reyes, 842 F.3d at 1135.
241. Id. at 1137–39.
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because it lumped together former gang members “regardless of the
length and recency of [their] membership”;242 the group of “deportees
was too amorphous, overbroad and diffuse because it included men,
women, and children of all ages, regardless of the length of time they
were in the United States, the reasons for their removal, or the recency of
their removal.”243
Both of these rejections are suspect, at least on their own terms.244
Unlike wealth or youth, which admit of degrees, someone either is or is
not a former gang member. The same goes for deportees from the United
States. Maybe no one in El Salvador cares that an individual belongs to
either group, but that would be a society-specific problem with those
groups’ social distinction—not their particularity. Assuming, as the
Ninth Circuit did, that particularity is about delineation and not a group’s
size or homogeneity,245 there should not be particularity problems in
groups based on gang membership, deportation, or gender.
Importantly, one can say this categorically. There is nothing factbound or society-specific about the binary nature of gang membership or
deportation status. Determining whether these groups have boundaries
that are sharp rather than ambiguous, or objective rather than subjective,
is like determining whether a trait is immutable: it is a question of law
that can be determined once and for all.246 When particularity is
understood this way, case-by-case adjudication of a group’s particularity
becomes unnecessary.
There is an exception to this claim, and it is suggested by the BIA’s
own example of landowners as a group that might be particular in an
underdeveloped oligarchy but not in Canada.247 As noted before, this is a
strange example since land ownership itself seems binary. But imagine
property ownership more broadly: there could be a difference between
Canada, where most everyone owns something, however little, and a
society where, say, everything is communal except for those at the top.
Property ownership would be on a spectrum in Canada but more
distinctly cabined in the oligarchy. Gender might provide a parallel
example. Although the gender binary remains entrenched in most of the
world, one can easily imagine a society in which gender was widely
viewed on a spectrum, like the Kinsey scale for sexual orientation. That
is to say that the particularity of gender-based groups could theoretically
242. Id. at 1137–38 (citing W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 221).
243. Id. at 1139 (citing W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 223).
244. See id. at 1139 n.12 (suggesting that a lack of evidence presented, rather than the group
definitions themselves, may have been more to blame for W-G-R-’s failure before the BIA).
245. Id. at 1135.
246. “Once and for all” of course only means that these issues can be decided as a
precedential matter, binding unless and until future judges are offered reasons sufficient to
overcome stare decisis.
247. See W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 214–15.
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vary across place and time, but in our current world, categorical
determinations can generally be made that groups like “Dominican
women” have the particularity needed to ground an asylum claim.248
Again, though, all of this depends on understanding particularity to
mean well-delineated. Were it to refer to a group’s size or the
heterogeneity of its membership, questions about particularity would
more likely be fact-intensive and society-specific, necessitating case-bycase answers. Are gang members drawn from a broad cross-section of
society? Are they a “major segment[] of the population”?249 These are
questions more like the typical social distinction determination, where
case-by-case adjudication is needed, not like questions about a term’s
ambiguity—something courts decide categorically all the time.250
This may be no place for a full defense of the proper way to interpret
the particularity requirement, yet it is worth underscoring: fuzzy
boundaries, rather than a group’s size or diversity, are what particularity
should be understood to preclude.251 Not only have the courts of appeals
increasingly taken this position,252 but size and diversity limitations are
inconsistent with the basic principles that have shaped social group
caselaw from its beginning in Acosta. As the Fifth Circuit said about
“membership in a particular social group” in Gonzales-Veliz v. Barr,
“‘Consistent with the interpretive canon “ejusdem generis,” the proper
interpretation of the phrase can be only achieved when it is compared
with the other enumerated grounds of persecution,’ such as race, religion,
nationality, and political opinion.”253 None of the other grounds are
limited by size, or the fact that members of a particular religion, for
example, may share little in common beyond their faith. Persecution can
target majority races and religions yet still give rise to asylum claims. It
is ironic, then, that the Fifth Circuit made its comparison of social groups
to the other four grounds only after saying that a gender-based social
248. See De Pena-Paniagua v. Barr, 957 F.3d 88, 95–96 (1st Cir. 2020) (“[I]t is difficult to
think of a country in which women are not viewed as ‘distinct’ from other members of society. In
some countries, gender serves as a principal, basic differentiation for assigning social and political
status and rights . . . . It is equally difficult to think of a country in which women do not form a
‘particular’ and ‘well-defined’ group of persons.”).
249. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 239 (B.I.A. 2014).
250. See, for example, the thousands of cases applying Step One of Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v.
Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984).
251. See DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES § 5:43 (2020 ed.)
(“[T]he Board’s clearest articulation of ‘particularity,’ is ‘definable boundaries . . . .’” (quoting
M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 239)).
252. See, e.g., De Pena-Paniagua, 957 F.3d at 96–97; Mayorga-Rosa v. Sessions, 888 F.3d
379, 384–85 (8th Cir. 2018); Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125, 1135 (9th Cir. 2016); Cece v.
Holder, 733 F.3d 662, 675–77 (7th Cir. 2013) (en banc).
253. Gonzales-Veliz v. Barr, 938 F.3d 219, 235 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting M-E-V-G-, 26 I. &
N. Dec. at 234).
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group “lacks particularity because ‘broad swaths of society may be
susceptible to victimization.’”254
Under current doctrine, particular social groups need to be
particular,255 but the substantive understanding of that requirement
affects whether it can be met categorically, or whether particularity, like
social distinction, needs to be decided on a case-by-case basis. Properly
understood in terms of delineation instead of size or diversity, the
particularity requirement should often, though not always, allow for
categorical decision-making. The problem with cases involving former
gang members and abused women is not that the Board answered the
particularity question categorically.256 The problem is that the BIA
answered the question incorrectly—perhaps because it misunderstood the
question itself.
C. Nexus
Issues around nexus are less complicated. Whether one of the five
grounds was or will be “one central reason”257 for someone’s persecution
will almost always require case-by-case adjudication in one basic sense:
judges need to ask why this particular applicant has or will be targeted.
But there are also obvious ways in which categorical decisions about
nexus can be made. Deciding whether the statute requires one of the
grounds to be the sole cause, a but-for cause, or merely a motivating
factor, is one such decision.258
The Rule discussed in Section II.A presents some slightly harder
cases. It says, for example, that the government, “in general, will not
favorably adjudicate” claims based on “[i]nterpersonal animus or
retribution;” “[p]erceived, past or present, gang affiliation;” or
“[g]ender.”259 The cases discussed in Section II.C read similar language

254. Id. at 232 (quoting Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 335 (A.G. 2018)).
255. “[T]he particularity requirement flows quite naturally from the language of the statute,
which, of course, specifically refers to membership in a ‘particular social group.’” Matter of WG-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 213 (B.I.A. 2014) (quoting Rivera-Barrientos v. Holder, 666 F.3d 641,
649 (10th Cir. 2012)), vacated in part, Reyes, 842 F.3d 1125.
256. But see Ordonez Azmen v. Barr, 965 F.3d 128, 132 (2d Cir. 2020) (noting that “per se
rules” about particularity would be improper); Diaz-Reynoso v. Barr, 968 F.3d 1070, 1087 (9th
Cir. 2020) (reminding the BIA that “[t]here are no shortcuts”).
257. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). For withholding claims, one of the five grounds just needs
to be “a reason,” id. § 1231(b)(3)(C) (emphasis added), a standard the Ninth Circuit has held to
be lower than that needed to show nexus for purposes of asylum, see Barajas-Romero v. Lynch,
846 F.3d 351, 360 (9th Cir. 2017).
258. See Barajas-Romero, 846 F.3d at 360.
259. Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal, 85 Fed. Reg. 80,274, 80,386
(Dec. 11, 2020) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 208, 235, 1003, 1208, 1235).
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as something less than categorical—more prediction than rule.260 But one
might ask whether rules of this sort could be made.
A categorical bar on claims based solely on interpersonal animus
might be possible.261 However, this is just a matter of logic: if an
individual persecutes someone solely because of a personal grudge, the
individual is not persecuting them on account of one of the five grounds,
as the nexus test requires.
By contrast, making a categorical rule against finding nexus in gangand gender-based cases would be improper. Gang- and gender-based
social groups might fail for any of the reasons already discussed—
immutability, social distinction, or particularity—and some of those
failures might be categorical. But there is no substantive basis in asylum
law for saying that being perceived as a former gang member, or being a
woman, will never be a central reason why someone is persecuted. In fact,
as discussed above, the Rule offers no reason why nexus should fail even
“in general” in such cases.262
Finally, the circularity issues encountered in Section II.D present an
example of where nexus only sometimes requires case-by-case
adjudication. One can categorically say that an applicant should fail the
nexus test if they define their social group in terms of the persecution they
are fleeing. But this, again, is—in the words of the Third Circuit—“a
matter of logic: motivation must precede action; and the social group
must exist prior to the persecution if membership in the group is to
motivate the persecution.”263
What cannot always be categorically decided is the question of
whether the group asserted actually is defined in terms of the persecution
alleged. So, in domestic violence cases, judges might need to decide,
case-by-case, the reason why the applicant cannot escape her marriage.
Is it because she fears her husband’s abuse, or because religion or
economics or cultural norms prevent her from leaving? Only the former
is impermissibly circular.
And even here, case-by-case adjudication of this issue would no
longer be required if victims of domestic violence framed their social
groups differently. “Women in Honduras who are unable to leave their
marriages because of religious prohibitions” is categorically not circular.
(Whether that group satisfies the social distinction requirement is another
260. See, e.g., Diaz-Reynoso, 968 F.3d at 1080 (“Despite the general and descriptive
observations set forth in the opinion, the Attorney General’s prescriptive instruction is clear: the
BIA must conduct the proper particular social group analysis on a case-by-case basis.”).
261. “Solely” is doing work here, for otherwise persecution that is based in part on
interpersonal animus might also have one of the five grounds as “a central reason” for the
persecution.
262. Supra Section II.A.
263. Sarkisian v. Att’y Gen., 322 F. App’x 136, 141 (3d Cir. 2009).
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matter.) Alternatively, a group like “women in Honduras” dodges the
circularity issue entirely.264
D. Symmetry
Throughout this Article, the choice between categorical and case-bycase adjudication has been framed symmetrically⸺as if any answers will
necessarily apply both to asylum-seekers and the government alike—to
decisions both extending and restricting protection. But is that true?
Though categorical decision-making during the Trump administration
was employed only to restrict eligibility for asylum, that need not be so.
The government might choose to categorically recognize certain social
groups or particular types of claims.265 Indeed, one overarching
asymmetry of doing so should be acknowledged at the outset: deciding
categorically that a particular group is not cognizable flatly defeats all
claims brought by persecuted members of those groups, whereas deciding
that a group is categorically cognizable does not lead to an automatic
grant of asylum. To the contrary, finding a group cognizable is only the
first step; nexus and persecution must still be shown, and bars to asylum
must still be sidestepped. The stakes of categorical decision-making are
thus far greater when employed restrictively than when being used to
expand who qualifies.
Should the Biden administration propose categorical expansions to
eligibility, asylum advocates would surely not be heard to complain about
the necessity of case-by-case adjudication. Their turnabout would
obviously be justified pragmatically—asylum advocates are responsible
for saving their clients, not for maintaining the law’s internal consistency
or theoretic purity. But there may in fact also be theoretical reasons why
categorical adjudication is more palatable, or case-by-case adjudication
less necessary, when granting rather than denying asylum claims.266

264. Cf. De Pena-Paniagua v. Barr, 957 F.3d 88, 95 (1st Cir. 2020) (“One might therefore
ask, why bother with ‘unable to leave’ in the group definition.”); Diaz-Reynoso, 968 F.3d at 1096
(Bress, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Whether the anti-circularity rule applies is
determined on a case-by-case basis by examining the proposed social group that an applicant
brings forward. But when the rule does apply, it is, indeed, a categorical one.” (citations omitted)).
265. For example, Congress in 1996 amended federal law to dictate categorically that those
who were “forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo involuntary sterilization . . . shall be deemed
to have been persecuted on account of political opinion.” Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations
Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, Division C, Title VI, § 601(a)(1), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009–689
(1996) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B)). In 2000, the Clinton Administration
considered but decided against a regulation making domestic violence victims categorically
eligible. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
266. Although this Article has argued against a due process right to case-by-case
adjudication, that would be an example of an asymmetric claim, were it applicable. After all, the
Due Process Clause protects individuals, including asylum-seekers, not the government.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2021

45

Florida Law Review, Vol. 73, Iss. 3 [2021], Art. 1

518

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73

Determining whether the government has more leeway in
categorically expanding rather than restricting asylum is important, not
least because case-by-case adjudication might not always be in asylumseekers’ interest.267 However useful it was as a cudgel against the Trump
administration’s sweeping restrictions to asylum,268 reinventing the
wheel through case-by-case adjudication is resource intensive, and those
seeking asylum often do not have resources to spare. It almost goes
without saying, then, that a refugee would rather point to binding
precedent, or some regulation, that makes former gang members or
domestic violence victims categorically cognizable instead of having to
assemble their own record demonstrating their group’s particularity and
social distinction.269 One problem with recent statutory arguments
demanding case-by-case adjudication is that, were they successful, they
might also be seen to preclude categorical decision-making that protects
asylees.270 So again, one must ask whether what is good for the goose
really is good for the gander: Is case-by-case adjudication, when
necessary for some, necessary for all?
The main place where case-by-case adjudication has proven necessary
is on the question of a group’s social distinction.271 Given how factbound, society-specific, and potentially evolving social distinction can
be, it seems unfair to preclude future asylum-seekers from making their
evidentiary showing simply because previous asylum seekers failed in
theirs.
The principle here is basically just the well-known procedural idea
that issue preclusion can only be applied against those who fully and
fairly litigated the issue in a previous case.272 To take an example from
above, Ordonez Azmen should not be prevented from showing that
former gang members are a socially distinct group simply because W-GR- failed to show it previously (especially since W-G-R-’s case arose out

267. Historically, in fact, the insistence on case-by-case adjudication of refugee claims has
been aimed at blocking protection rather than expanding it. The 1980 Refugee Act, which
established the parameters of the current asylum system in the United States, was driven in
significant part by Congressional displeasure with the way the Executive Branch used its so-called
“parole” authority to admit refugees on a group-wide rather than individualized basis. See Soucek,
supra note 18, at 185–87.
268. See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text.
269. As noted above, President Biden has instructed the Attorney General and Secretary of
Homeland Security to review current U.S. protections for “those fleeing domestic or gang
violence.” See Executive Order 14,010, 86 Fed. Reg. 8267, 8271 (Feb. 2, 2021).
270. See supra notes 208–13 and accompanying text.
271. See supra Section III.A.
272. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327 n.7 (1979) (“It is a violation of
due process for a judgment to be binding on a litigant who was not a party or a privy and therefore
has never had an opportunity to be heard.”).
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of El Salvador and Ordonez Azmen fled Guatemala).273 One applicant’s
loss cannot preclude the possibility of a future applicant’s win. Thus,
case-by-case consideration is needed.
Accepting that principle, however, still leaves two questions
unanswered: first, whether anything prevents the government from
saying on its own, categorically, that former gang members or other
groups are socially distinct; and second, whether a case in which an
asylum-seeker successfully proved social distinction could preclude the
government from denying that group’s distinction going forward. In other
words, even if an asylum-seeker’s loss cannot preclude a future win,
might a win preclude future losses? This Article finishes by taking these
questions in order.
First, any restriction on the Biden administration’s ability to deem a
particular social group categorically cognizable would have to come from
one of two sources: either the Administrative Procedure Act (if the
categorical decision was made through regulation and courts found it
arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law);274 or an appellate court’s
reversal of a BIA or Attorney General decision (if the court found their
interpretation of “particular social group” unreasonable under Chevron
Step Two).275
This is where the statutory arguments that some advocates have
advanced recently about case-by-case adjudication could hurt asylumseekers down the road. Recall that the main statutory claim is that
categorical decisions restricting social groups illicitly add to the statutory
bars explicitly enumerated in federal law.276 Categorical decision-making
is said to usurp Congress’s power to say what asylum law protects. Were
that so, however, it should follow that categorical decisions expanding
asylum protections illicitly add to the five explicit statutory grounds
spelled out in federal law. This would similarly usurp Congress’s power.
In fact, neither is true. As argued throughout this Article, when
categorical decision-making about asylum is barred, it is because of the
nature of the question being decided—not because of any constitutional
or statutory limitation. So, any attempt to categorically deem certain
groups cognizable, whether through adjudication or regulation, should
succeed unless it strikes courts as an unexplained or unreasonable
departure from past agency interpretations of the asylum statute.277
273. Compare Ordonez Azmen v. Barr, 965 F.3d 128 (2d Cir. 2020), with Matter of W-GR-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208 (B.I.A. 2014); see also supra Section II.B.
274. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
275. See Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844–45 (1984).
276. See supra notes 208–13 and accompanying text.
277. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009) (“[T]he agency
must show that there are good reasons for the new policy. But it need not demonstrate to a court’s
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Second, even if the government were unwilling to make its own
binding policy through adjudication or regulation, could it be
categorically bound anyway? Ordinarily, an issue fully and fairly litigated
by and decided against a party—the social distinction of a certain group
in a certain country, for example—could be given preclusive effect in
future litigation against that party, preventing them from being able to
relitigate a battle they previously fought and lost.278 Nonmutual offensive
collateral estoppel, as this type of preclusion is formally known, would
mean that future asylum-seekers could benefit from a previous
applicant’s win, even though they cannot be harmed by a previous
applicant’s loss.279 The asymmetry of issue preclusion could prove
especially lifesaving to asylum applicants since it would preserve the
possibility of case-by-case adjudication for those who hope to do better
than others who came before them. But it would offer a form of
categorical adjudication for those wanting to benefit from predecessors
who won.
The problem here is United States v. Mendoza,280 which held on
policy grounds that nonmutual issue preclusion does not bind the U.S.
government as it does private parties.281 The Mendoza doctrine has come
in for withering critique,282 and some of its rationales—like the idea that
precluding the government from relitigating an issue it lost would
“impede the development of the law through ‘percolation’ in the lower
courts”283—are especially inapplicable to asylum claims, which are
funneled through a single agency. The idea of nonmutual offensive issue
preclusion is well-suited to the practical realities of asylum adjudication,
where the government has far greater resources than its opponents and
the same incentives to litigate every case with equal vigor. But with
Mendoza standing in the way, asylum advocates would do better to seek
precedential opinions and regulations rather than preclusion. One major
point of this Article is to show that nothing in either the Constitution or
federal immigration law stands in the way of an administration that wants
satisfaction that the reasons for the new policy are better than the reasons for the old one; it
suffices that the new policy is permissible under the statute, that there are good reasons for it, and
that the agency believes it to be better, which the conscious change of course adequately
indicates.”).
278. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 (AM. L. INST. 1982); see also id. § 83 cmt.
b (applying this principle to administrative tribunals).
279. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 329–30 (1979).
280. 464 U.S. 154 (1984).
281. Id. at 158.
282. See, e.g., Zachary D. Clopton, National Injunctions and Preclusion, 118 MICH. L. REV.
1, 5 (2019) (“There is no justifiable reason to reflexively treat federal defendants differently from
other defendants for preclusion purposes, and there are other preclusion doctrines that protect the
interests purportedly at stake.”).
283. Id. at 22.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol73/iss3/1

48

Soucek: Categorical Confusion in Asylum Law

2021]

CATEGORICAL CONFUSION IN ASYLUM LAW

521

to expand eligibility for particular social groups in a categorical, rather
than a case-by-case, manner.
CONCLUSION
Protests against categorical decision-making in asylum law have
themselves been overly categorical. They are not attentive enough to the
particulars of what actually drives the need for case-by-case adjudication.
Case-by-case adjudication is not an abstract procedural necessity that
is somehow inherent in the nature of asylum claims. Rather, it is
something that is required, sometimes, based on the nature of the
substantive issues that arise within asylum claims. In social group cases,
for example, immutability does not require individualized attention, but
social distinction does. Particularity lies somewhere in between, and the
need for case-by-case application of that test depends in large part on
what the test means.
The idea that categorical adjudication is appropriate (or not) based
solely on the nature of the question being adjudicated, is one that has been
largely missing in recent fights over the future of asylum law. The Trump
administration’s sweeping regulations on asylum betrayed the
government’s confusion on this point. That is why its lawyers appeared
in court arguing that they could make categorical decisions about asylum
if they want, but also complaining when groups like families and
domestic violence victims have received protection on a categorical basis.
Asylum advocates, meanwhile, repeatedly and often successfully
insisted on case-by-case adjudication as a way of fighting the Trump
administration’s categorical restrictions. But some of the arguments they
made along the way could make it harder for the current administration
to change course and extend categorical protections down the road.
Insisting on case-by-case adjudication as a general rule would impose its
expense and complications on refugees who, due to poverty and trauma,
are so often unprepared to bear them.
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